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Emotions are ever-present, transient, and powerful mental states that become especially relevant in 
social situations. As humans develop, we construct lay intuitions about the nature of emotions and about 
how emotions function in the mind and body. Specifically, we accrue beliefs about the controllability and 
malleability of emotions. Entity theorists regard emotions as being relatively fixed and difficult to control. 
On the other hand, Incremental theorists view emotions as being relatively malleable and controllable. 
These dichotomous implicit theories are known to propagate different cognitive, affective, and behavioral 
effects. While implicit theories have been researched in the context of social judgment previously, these 
studies were limited to implicit theories of psychological attributes, like personality/morality/intelligence, 
and not theories of mental states, like emotions. In this dissertation, I draw from the various fields of 
cognitive science, moral philosophy, and social psychology to posit: are Implicit Theories of Emotion 
related to Social Judgment? And if so, what is the specific relationship between these constructs? Thus, in 
Study 1, I sought to answer these questions by using Tamir et al. (2017) Implicit Theories of Emotions Scale 
to measure emotion beliefs and by creating narrative scenarios for a blame attribution task. Study 1 also 
explored the relationship between Implicit Theories of Emotion and self-perceived emotion regulation 
tendencies, emotion regulation self-efficacy, and the perceived value of emotion regulation. The results of 
Study 1 demonstrated that Implicit Theories of Emotions are related to Social Judgment. Specifically, being 
an Incremental theorist was associated with attributing more blame to actors behaving transgressively than 
being an Entity theorist. This was a correlative trend reversal from the extant research that studied the 
relationship between Implicit Theories of Psychological Attributes (such as Personality and Morality) and 
Judgment. In these studies, Entity theorists tend to attribute more blame to actors behaving transgressively. 
Study 1 also demonstrated that that being an Incremental theorist was related to frequent use of cognitive 
reappraisal, having an augmented emotion regulation self-efficacy, and a perception that being able to 
emotionally regulate is an important human quality. In contrast, Entity theorists were associated with 
ascribing less blame to actors, less frequent use of cognitive reappraisal, attenuated emotion self-efficacy, 
and were less likely to believe that emotional self-regulation is an important quality. Study 2 measured 
subjects’ Implicit Theories of both Emotions and Personality and correlated these variables with blame 
attribution across different types of narrative scenarios. I was able to replicate the correlations from Study 
1, which demonstrated that being an Incremental theorist is associated with placing harsher blame on actors 
behaving transgressively. Additionally, Study 2 established a causal relationship between Implicit Theories 
of Emotion and Social Judgment by manipulating subjects’ implicit theories using contrived scientific 
articles and priming activities. Participants who were taught the Entity theory of emotions attributed more 
blame to actors behaving transgressively than those who were taught the Incremental theory of emotions. I 
theorized that when people are taught a strong Entity theory of emotions, the concept of ‘emotions’ becomes 
more like the concept of a psychological attribute (a stable ‘trait-like’ entity). Therefore, when judging 
others, ‘person control’ judgment variables (such as intentionality and foreseeability) are not as relevant 
and these individuals become vulnerable to affect biases and to judgments based on dispositional inferences. 
Teaching an Incremental theory of emotions, on the other hand, had the effect of attenuating aggressive 
judgment. These findings have important educational and clinical implications.  
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A king dreams his young son has died. He falls 
 
into such grief in the dream that the world 
darkens, and his body grows inert.  
suddenly he wakes into a joy he’s never felt.  
 
His son is alive! He thinks to himself, 
such sorrow causes such joy. It is a kind  
of joke on human beings that we are pulled  
 
between these two states as though with ropes 
on the side of a collar.  
 





The various implicit beliefs that humans accumulate about emotions often manifest themselves in 
art and literature, usually long before they become explicit ‘expert’ scientific theories. As with Rumi’s 
poem above, the ‘king’, through experience, acquires a naive belief: that the feeling of deep sorrow allows 
for a subsequent juxtaposing sensation of extreme joy. This intuited theory of affect, if you will, enlightens 
the king to a second intuition, which we infer from Rumi’s use of a rope and collar metaphor: that humans 
have very little control over their emotional states. Instead, our emotions control and enslave us.  Like the 
king, people acquire many of their naive beliefs about the human emotion system through experience. Might 
these emotion-specific beliefs have any implicit effects on how we perceive or judge individuals for their 
behavior? If so, these intuitions would have potentially malignant and/or beneficial intrapersonal and 
interpersonal consequences. Especially if people never become consciously aware of how these emotion 






Chapter 1: Theoretical Foundations 
 
The Epistemic Hunger of the Human Mind: Cognitive Basis of Naive Intuitions  
 
The human cognitive system is inherently curious; it desires to make sense of experience. From our 
very first sensations, perhaps the rush of breath into our newly formed lungs, the sound of our own voices 
screeching into existence, or even the first felt flesh of another human, our mother’s skin, the nervous 
system begins to engage in epistemic processes that help us to understand the shifting sensations that 
surround and engulf us. As our cognitive faculties mature, in an attempt to comprehend, predict, and control 
our internal and external realities, the mind begins to spontaneously construct implicit models of the world, 
which continuously adjust throughout our lives (Wellman & Gelman, 1998; Ben-Artzi, 1995-1996; Craik, 
1943; Johnson & Laird, 2006; Anderson, J.R., 2009). For example, it has been well established that people 
accrue naive beliefs about their physical reality, beliefs about gravity and matter and forces, before ever 
setting foot into a physics classroom (Slotta & Chi, 2006; Reiner, Slotta, & Chi, 2000; Chi, 2008; Chi et 
al., 1981; Disessa, 2002). Additionally, through a combination of observing others, explicit instruction, and 
self-discovery, humans acquire intuitions about their own ‘selves’ collectively known as the ‘conceptual 
self’ (Neisser, 1988; Anderson, 1990). These lay theories include beliefs about our physical bodies, abilities, 
interpersonal communication, as well as abstract internal conceptions of entities such as the ‘soul’, ‘free 
will’, moral responsibility, and various mental states (Neisser, 1988; Dweck, 1986; Nichols and Knobe, 
2007). Consequently, these beliefs labelled ‘naive beliefs/conceptions/intuitions’, ‘lay intuitions’, and 
‘implicit theories’ (as they are referred to in the cognitive, philosophical, and psychological literature), 
create semantic frameworks that are implicit in the development of inferences, motivations, goals, and 
ultimately behavior. Implicit beliefs provide us with a ‘cognitive lens’ through which we can interpret 
reality (Epstein, 1989; Murphy and Medin, 1985; Cabello, 2015; Ben-Artzi, 1995-1996; Wellman & 
Gelman, 1998).  
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 Naive theories of ‘self’, ‘other’, and ‘world’ have several intrinsic features of interest. I’ve 
previously discussed that these beliefs are experientially acquired and comprise epistemologically relevant 
cognitive structures. Additionally, they are thought to be ‘implicit’ because they are implied rather than 
held explicitly, and the influences of these knowledge structures work in ways that are not consciously, and 
thus introspectively, known (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Also, albeit they serve an interpretive function 
by helping us understand the world, many naive beliefs have a precarious connection to language (Disessa, 
2002). To clarify, when intuitions guide cognitions and behaviors, they achieve such ends without any 
explicit verbalizations from the person holding them (Miller, Burgoon, Hall, 2007; Dweck, Chiu, Hong, 
1995). Thus, because of their implicit nature, these theories become difficult to study empirically, and 
scientists must make a meticulously systematic effort to identify them, establish nomological networks, and 
map out their effects (Dweck et al. 1995).  
An additional feature of lay theories is that they are not necessarily ‘correct’ or ‘objectively true’ 
since they are accrued through experiential and not scientific means. In fact, decades worth of research has 
been dedicated to the empirical examination of differences in understanding between novice naive theories 
and expert (non intuitive) beliefs, particularly in domains such as physics and biology, in an effort to 
identify firmly-held robust misconceptions that may be particularly resistant to instruction. More often than 
not, lay theories, such as in the domain of physics, are at least partially inaccurate even after substantial 
experience (Slotta & Chi, 2006; Reiner, Slotta, & Chi, 2000; Chi, 2008; Disessa, 2002). The meticulous 
cataloguing of changes that a lay conception must undergo to transition from ‘novice’ to an ‘expert’, has 
even given rise to a field of inquiry called ‘conceptual change’. These scientists postulate that some of the 
misconceptions in naive thinking are particularly ‘robust’ because students have difficulties making 
adjustments to the ontological nature of concepts (Slotta et al. 2006). This means that as naive conceptions 
develop, novices incorrectly assign ontological labels such as processes, mental states, and entities to things 
in their internal and external reality prior to expert instruction (Slotta et al. 2006). For example, Chi & Slotta 
(1994) explain that many novice physics students often believe gravity to be an entity, a ‘thing’ that is ‘in 
the earth’. However, gravity is actually an emergent constraint-based interaction between the earth and 
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other objects, and thus, a process (Chi, Slotta, and de Leeuw, 1994). Not only can people have 
misconceptions in lay knowledge about the entities in the world, but they can also have varying inaccurate 
(or accurate) beliefs about the nature of their intelligence, morality, and personality (Dweck et al. 1995). 
For example, a person can believe that ‘morality’ is a fixed trait, and that people are inherently either 
immoral or moral individuals, while another individual can hold the opposite view, namely, that morality 
is a malleable attribute that can change with experience and education. In the forthcoming sections of this 
paper, I will demonstrate why the inaccurate ontological labelling of our naive conceptions is particularly 
relevant with respect to implicit theories of emotions and the social consequences that this knowledge 
perpetuates.  
 Emotions are an essential part of our intrapersonal and interpersonal worlds. Human beings 
construct knowledge structures about the nature of emotions and about how emotions function in the mind 
and body (Flavell, 2004; Lakoff, 1987; Chi, 2008; Wranick, Barrett, & Salovey, 2007; Barrett 2006). These 
knowledge structures are not necessarily ‘objectively correct’ or align with expert emotion theories (as is 
the case with naïve theories of ‘physics’ or ‘biology’), but nonetheless implicitly impact cognition, and 
ultimately, behavior. However, lay theories of emotion have yet to be studied extensively in the cognitive 
sciences, although they appear to have much relevance in the realm of social judgment (Dweck et al. 1995). 
Thus, this theoretical chapter will continue a specific line of inquiry in the context of Implicit Theories of 
Emotion, naive beliefs pertaining to the malleability and controllability of emotions, adapted by Tamir et 
al. (2007) from Dweck’s original research on mindsets (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Livingstone, 2012; Tamir 
et al. 2007). The underlying premise is that emotion theories act as knowledge structures that implicitly 
affect social perception, specifically, social judgment of actors’ displaying negatively valenced behavior. 
 
The Duality of Man’s (Implicit Knowledge): Incremental and Entity Implicit Theories  
 
 In the 1970s, Carol Dweck conducted studies that highlighted two divergent ways in which children 
respond to academic challenges. When encountering failure in the school environment, one subset of 
children was inclined to respond with a ‘helplessness’ pattern, which means they experienced distress and 
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became disengaged from the study’s challenges. Interestingly, these children also shirked opportunities to 
develop and improve their skills if it meant that they might encounter future failures (Dweck & Reppucci, 
1973). However, the other subset of children responded with a ‘mastery oriented’ pattern; they sustained 
engagement while executing tasks and did not experience severe stress over challenges. Moreover, they did 
not view failure as a sign of their shortcomings. Instead, for these kids, failure had less utilitarian 
implications; it was an indication that they should increase their effort or change their problem-solving 
strategies (Dweck et al. 1973). Thus, for the mastery-oriented children failure was not necessarily an end, 
but a potential means to a more fruitful end.  
 What contributed to the motivational differences observed by the children in Dweck’s (1973) 
study? Dweck believes that the differences were associated with two distinct implicit theories of 
psychological attributes: Entity vs. Incremental theories. Entity theorists view psychological attributes as 
being fixed and beyond one’s own control, while incremental theorists view attributes as being malleable 
and controllable. According to Dweck’s research, the two implicit theories act as frameworks that propagate 
distinct goals and attributions, which then impel respective cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses 
(Dweck et al. 1995; Dweck 1999).  
Implicit theories have been studied across various psychological attribute domains, and are 
considered to be domain specific (Dweck et al. 1995; Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Ho-Ying Fu, 1997). Therefore, 
people can hold different implicit beliefs depending on the specific kind of psychological attribute in 
question (personality, morality, intelligence). It is entirely possible for an individual to believe that morality 
and personality can be malleable across the human lifespan, but that intelligence is relatively fixed (Dweck 
et al. 1995; Chiu et al. 1997). Additionally, implicit theories, as predictor variables, are most related to 
outcome variables within the same domain (Dweck et al. 1995; Romero et al. 2014; Yeager 2014). For 
example, implicit theories of intelligence are related to outcome variables like academic achievement and 
college enrollment. Implicit theories of personality are related to outcome variables in the social-emotional 
realm, like peer support and general well-being (Dweck, 1986, 1999; Dweck et al. 1995; Chiu et al. 1997). 
However, there isn’t always an immediately obvious domain match between implicit theories and the 
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outcome variables in experiments. For example, research has demonstrated that students with incremental 
theories of intelligence, using their mastery-oriented goals and strategies, are often able to overcome not 
just academic obstacles during adolescence, but are also more successful at navigating significant life 
transitions such as the progression from elementary school to high school (Blackwell et al., 2007; Cabello, 
2015). Theories of intelligence (Dweck, 1991; Dweck et al. 1995), personality (Chiu et al. 1997; Erdley & 
Dweck, 1993), and morality (Chiu et al. 1997; Haidt, 2001; Miller, Burgoon, & Hall, 2007) make up the 
bulk of implicit theory research.  
The entity and incremental views of attributes differ in their foundational assumption; they’re either 
static or evolving over time. Consequently, this fosters different epistemic approaches to understanding the 
‘self’ and ‘others’, that is, either by quantifying and measuring stable traits or by analyzing them in flux 
(Whitehead 1938; Johnson, Germer, & Overton, 1988; Dweck et al., 1995). The differing epistemic 
approaches have fascinating implications. For entity theorists who believe that their attributes are static, the 
epistemic approach is to treat every performance-type instance as an evaluation of self (Dweck et al. 1995; 
Chiu, 1997). This is because, although entity theorists believe that their attributes are fixed, these theorists 
don’t know if the attributes are fixed at a level of ‘sustained-mastery’ or ‘sustained-incompetence’ (Dweck 
et al. 1995; Chiu, 1997). The lack of clarity engenders extreme self-scrutiny. So, every success or failure is 
a glimpse at one’s own dispositional ability (or inability), and thus, self-worth. Dweck explains that, in 
addition to abstaining from difficult tasks, entity theorists will also exhibit a preoccupation with validation 
and will incessantly attempt to safeguard their own image to themselves and others (Dweck, et al. 1995). 
Sadly, a hypervigilant ego seems misplaced when individuals could otherwise be focusing on the effort and 
passion necessary to effectuate true learning, in all of its desired difficulties (Landauer & Bjork, 1978). 
However, the entity strategy tends to create a seemingly knowable and readily identifiable reality (Dweck 
et al. 1995). For incrementalists, ‘the self’ and ‘reality’ cannot be known at a particular moment. Rather, to 
interpret events, they tend to consider the psychological and situational mediators of a situation, things like 
emotional state and prior beliefs (Dweck et al. 1995). But, believing in the malleability of features suggests 
that the reality of one’s abilities can never be understood with conviction, since one is always in flux 
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(Dweck et al. 1995; Dweck et al. 1995). An existentially precarious thought, for some. Perhaps the 
incremental theorists can find some solace in Voltaire, “Uncertainty is an uncomfortable position. But 
certainty is an absurd one.” As previously noted, incremental theorists fare better than entity theorists as 
they employ mastery-oriented strategies when faced with obstacles such as academic challenges and life 
transitions (Dweck et al. 1995; Chiu et al. 1997).  However, this should not imply that an Incremental theory 
is always the most beneficial theory to hold for every person and across all contexts. While the Incremental 
position is generally associated with better outcomes, Dweck argues that either theory can become adaptive 
and ideal in different situations (Dweck et al. 1995). 
A logical follow-up question to be asked is: Can people hold more than one implicit theory within 
the same domain? Dweck and colleagues (1995) explain that, logically, the two perspectives are mutually 
exclusive; having a belief that the world or a particular attribute cannot be changed and controlled is the 
polar opposite of believing that it can (Dweck et al. 1995). However, Dweck further elaborates by 
explicating that people can also hold both theories, and that in certain scenarios with specific constraints, 
one intuition can be biased over the other (Dweck et al., 1995). As psychologists and cognitive scientists 
can affirm, our heuristics often impel us to hold logically contradicting beliefs; and people don’t usually go 
to great lengths to sift through the various inconsistencies in their minds (Dweck et al., 1995; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1975). To clarify, one implicit theory may take precedence over the other by more often 
contributing to a person’s cognition and behavior, but it may also become temporarily impotent during 
particular situations. In cognition research, researchers have also demonstrated the ability to ‘induce’ 
participants with an entity or incremental perspective by exposing them to ‘contrived’ scientific articles 
that argue for the static or malleable facets of personal characteristics (Chiu et al. 1997; Levy et al. 1998; 
McConnell, 2001; Plaks et al. 2001). These studies are doubly important because they reveal that 1. People 
can be experimentally convinced to hold temporary implicit intuitions, which may not match their default 
ones and, because of this 2. Scientists can establish causal, and not just correlational relationships, between 
implicit theories and the psychological outcomes that they determine (Dweck et al., 1995; Chiu et al., 1997; 
McConnell, 2001; Plaks et al., 2001).  
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To operationalize the construct of ‘implicit theories’, Carol Dweck devised a scale that has since 
been adapted to suit several different attribute domains. The items assess the constructs of ‘control’ (how 
much control we have over our psychological attributes) and ‘malleability’ (how substantially attributes 
can change over time). The items of Dweck’s Implicit Theories of Intelligence Scale (Dweck, 1999) can be 
seen here.  
 
Item 1 [reverse scored]: You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic 
intelligence 
Item 2 [reverse scored]: Your intelligence is something about you that you can’t change 
very much 
Item 3 [reverse scored]: You have a certain amount of intelligence and you really can’t do 




Implicit Theories of Emotions: Theory and Empirical Findings  
 
 There is a paucity of emotion intuitions research in cognitive science even though both child and 
adult laypersons have a cache of naive beliefs about the nature of emotions (Flavell & Green 1999; Flavell, 
Green, & Flavell 1998; D’Andrade, 1987; Wellman & Hickling, 1994). For example, many people 
recognize that just as we can have unintended and undesired thoughts, we can experience unintended and 
undesired emotions (Flavell & Green, 1999). Also, children and adults are inclined to believe that stopping 
sad thoughts is more difficult than interrupting neutral thoughts (Seja, 1995). Flavell & Green (1999) agree 
that, as with other naive conceptions, many beliefs pertaining to various mental states can also be 
‘inaccurate’ or ‘deceptive’. For example, individuals tend to overestimate the utility of suppression as a 
regulation strategy to attenuate negative affect (Flavell & Green, 1999). With respect to controllability, 
Flavell & Green (1999) argue that this is a particularly pertinent construct to study because a pivotal part 
of understanding a mental state hinges on how much control we have over its occurrence, intensity, and 
duration (Flavell & Green, 1999). And not only does this knowledge of a mental state help us to regulate 
it, but it also helps us distinguish it from other mental states (Flavell & Green, 1999; John & Gross, 2013; 
Frijda 1988). Lisa Feldman Barrett theorizes that folk conceptions of emotion controllability and 
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automaticity tend to dictate our rendering of emotions in both ‘self’ and ‘other’, and can be reflected in our 
social institutions and protocols (Barrett, Ochsner, & Gross, 2005). She cites Dressler (2001), for example, 
and explicates that in the US a violent crime determined as having stemmed from the ‘sudden heat of 
passion’ can reduce the sentencing of an ‘intentional homicide’ to an offense of ‘voluntary manslaughter’ 
(Dressler, 2001; Barrett et al., 2005). It is no wonder then, that the few existing attempts at unearthing naïve 
emotion beliefs have focused mainly on the controllability and malleability of these mental states.  
 But what other research on emotions intuitions exists? In 1995 and 1996, Ben-Artzi created a scale 
to measure lay theories of emotion by asking participants to freely name and describe salient facets of 
emotions. When he qualitatively assessed these answers, he found that people spontaneously appraise 
emotions as fitting into eight categorical characteristics, which are subsumed by two superordinate theories: 
a threat appraisal and a benefit appraisal (Ben-Artzi, 1995; Ben-Artzi & Mikulincer, 1996). The 
characteristics of emotion that people noted, subsumed under these two appraisals, are: 1. (Threat) 
uncontrollability; bizarreness; disturbance; instability; and unpredictability 2. (Benefit) motivational power; 
intensity; and experiential significance (Ben-Artzi, 1995). Interestingly, participants spontaneously noted 
their inability to control emotions, rather than their ability to control emotions (hence control isn’t under 
the ‘benefit’ appraisal), which may indicate that ‘emotion controllability’ is generally seen as a saliently 
precarious construct for lay persons. Additionally, emotion theorists agree that the definition of the word 
‘emotion’ is unclear and ambiguous, which is a major challenge when studying lay intuitions of emotion 
(Ben-Artzi, 1995; Ben-Artzi, 1996; Frijda, 1988; Barrett, 2006; Ratcliffe, 2005). However, just because 
people can’t define exactly what emotions are, doesn’t mean they can’t harbor beliefs about them (Ben-
Artzi, 1995; Ben-Artzi, 1996; Nichols & Knobe, 2007). Ben-Artzi believes that the empirical study of 
emotion naive beliefs is important because: 1. Lay theory content can contribute to expert knowledge 
(further clarifying what lay persons mean when they refer to ‘emotions’) 2. Individual differences in 
intuitive beliefs can help explain different appraisals of a given emotional episode and how these appraisals 
affect behavior (Ben-Artzi, 1995; Ben-Artzi, 1996; Nichols and Knobe, 2007). Ben-Artzi was the first 
researcher to use free-response to categorize attributes that people ascribe to emotional phenomena and, 
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subsequently, these qualitative categorizations helped create The Lay Theories of Emotion (LTE) scale. 
The scale enabled Ben-Artzi to conduct further studies to assess individual differences among the identified 
lay characteristics of emotion (Ben-Artzi, 1995; 1996).   
It has been suggested that emotion conceptual knowledge shapes emotion perception, 
phenomenological experience, and behavior (Warnick, Barrett, & Salovey, 2007; Barrett, 2006). 
Accordingly, in 2007, Maya Tamir & John Gross adapted Dweck’s Implicit Theories of Intelligence Scale 
to suit the ‘emotions’ domain. They wanted to observe if these emotion-specific implicit theories might be 
connected to affective and social outcomes across major life transitions, such as the transition from high 
school to freshman year of college (Tamir et al. 2007). The study had several interesting findings. First, 
Implicit theories of emotion and emotion regulation tendencies, operationalized using the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ), were analyzed for a correlational relationship (Gross & John, 2003; Tamir 
et al. 2007). Results indicated that, before entering college, entity theorists made less use of cognitive 
reappraisal than incremental theorists. However, there was no statistical correlation between implicit 
theories of emotion and use of expressive suppression as a regulation strategy (Tamir et al. 2007). Second, 
during the first academic semester of college, entity theorists were found to have less favorable emotional 
experiences and received decreased social support from their new peers (Tamir et al. 2007). Weekly entries 
in personal diaries corroborated this finding (Tamir et al. 2007). Additionally, by the end of freshman year, 
both self and peer reports demonstrated that entity theorists exhibited more symptoms of depression, a 
decreased sense of well-being, and less social adjustment to their college environment as compared to 
incremental theorists (Tamir et al. 2007). The Tamir & Gross study prompted several other implicit theories 
of emotion studies which looked at correlations to other outcome variables like ‘ability emotional 
intelligence’ (operationalized by scores on the MSCEIT) (Cabello 2015; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & 
Sitarenios, 2003), emotional functioning in middle schoolers (Romero, 2014), and mental health symptoms 
and hypothetical treatment choices among college students (Schroder, Dawood, & Yalch, 2015). In all of 
these studies the researchers found significant correlations between the implicit theories of emotion and the 
outcome variables listed above. Specifically, the studies emphasized that entity theorists (rather than 
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incremental theorists) were associated with having lower ability emotional intelligence and social-
emotional functioning, show more symptoms of mental health disorders such as depression and anxiety, 
and had a predilection toward choosing pharmaceutical interventions over therapy (Cabello, 2015; Romero, 
2014; Schroder et al., 2015). The Tamir & Gross (2007) Implicit Theories of Emotion Scale can be seen 
below. Two of the scale’s items specifically address the construct of ‘control’, while the other two address 
the construct of ‘malleability’. Additionally, there are two items meant to test for incremental beliefs, and 
two items meant to test for entity beliefs (Tamir et al., 2007):  
Item 1 [Incremental; Control]: Everyone can learn to control their emotions 
Item 2 [incremental; Malleability]: If they want to, people can change the emotions they 
have 
Item 3 [entity; reverse scored; Control]: The truth is people have very little control of 
their emotions 
Item 4 [entity; reverse scored; Malleability]: No matter how hard they try, people can’t 
really change the emotions that they have 
 
 Before I proceed, an important clarification must be made. Emotions are inherently different from 
the other implicit theory constructs that have been previously analyzed by Carol Dweck and colleagues. 
Intelligence, morality, and personality are psychological attributes, which means that they are trait-like 
constructs. Emotions, however, are mental states. And mental states differ from attributes in their 
temporality, as they are much more ephemeral in nature (Tamir et al., 2007). So, how might this make 
studying implicit theories of emotion different than studying other implicit theories? Might this discrepancy 
bias people to believe that emotions are generally more malleable and, thus, produce greater proportions of 
incremental theorists than in other domains? Perhaps. But there is also reason to believe that many people 
perceive emotions as being more ‘trait-like’, like psychological attributes, and therefore less malleable. 
This stems from the incorrect ontological categorizations of many lay theories (akin to the robust 
misconceptions that novice physics learners display). Instead of perceiving emotions as mental states, 
which they are, people can also view emotions more like ‘things/objects’, like entities. Lakoff (1987) 
emphasizes that our use of language, particularly metaphoric language, reinforces the ‘robust 
misconception’ that emotions are entities rather than emergent mental states. Idiomatic phrasings such as 
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‘he let out his anger’ and ‘I can barely contain my rage’ are linguistic manifestations of this incorrect 
ontological categorization of emotions (Lakoff, 1987; Chi, 2008). These metaphors liken emotions to 
‘objects’ that can be contained and released. Additionally, Lisa Feldman Barrett (2006) states that even 
affect scientists have historically based psychological models of emotion on the assumption that emotions 
are entities. Only very recently in the history of psychological science have researchers progressed from 
thinking about emotions as ‘unitary faculties of the mind’ to thinking about them as ‘emergent phenomena 
that vary within the immediate context’ (Barrett, 2006). Barrett implies that this misconception is pervasive, 
even among experts, because unlike other cognitively gestaltian phenomena like attention, emotions have 
specific words for specific categories (sadness, anger, fear), which reinforces the idea that emotions are 
natural kinds or entities in nature (Barrett, 2006). Ultimately, Barrett asserts that emotions are more like 
thoughts and beliefs: they are states and not things (Barrett, 2006). The implicit theory consequences for 
ontologically different constructs (psychological traits vs. mental states) warrants further research.  
 
Fig 1. This diagram distinguishes psychological attributes and mental states as belonging to different 






Implicit Theories, Moral Sensibility, and Social Judgment 
 
Psychologists and philosophers have both come to believe that moral and social intuitions are 
manifestations of underlying implicit conceptions of self, society, and the world (Sandel, 1984; Chiu et al. 
1997; Knobe, 2007). Together, explicit moral beliefs and their underlying intuitions encompass a semantic 
framework that drives moral sensibility and subsequent action (Schwartz, 1992; Epstein 1989; Knobe, 
2007). Specifically, intuitive beliefs can then drive specific patterns of social characterization and judgment 
that occur in a manner akin to perception (Molden, Plaks, & Dweck 2006; Haidt, 2001). This is known as 
the Social Intuitionist Model: moral and social judgment are generally the result of quick, automatic 
evaluations known as intuitions (Haidt, 2001; Uleman, Saribay, & Gonzalez, 2008). Thus, it is no surprise 
that the constructs of social perception and judgment have made their way into the cache of studies that 
utilize implicit theories scales. Some of Dweck and colleagues’ (1995; 1997) initial implicit theories 
experiments included evaluative judgments of others as their outcome variables. However, it must be noted 
that the theory measures in these paradigms were implicit theories of morality and personality, which are 
theories of attributes and not mental states (different ontological categories). In Chiu (1997), after being 
tested for personality implicit theories, participants were exposed to narrative scenarios that described 
undesirable behavior among school children and were asked to provide ratings of blameworthiness and 
recommend punishments (Chiu et al., 1997). What these studies discovered was that entity theorists were 
placing more blame on misbehaving school children and recommended harsher punishments than 
incremental theorists. Additionally, entity theorists were apt to make quick, often generalized judgments of 
others, even on the basis of very little contextual information (Dweck et al., 1995). These judgments tended 
to be on-line trait-based judgments (McConnell, 2001; Chiu et al., 1997). Thus, observing (or reading 
about) a single instance of transgressive behavior (in a very particular context) is enough for the entity 
theorist to conclude that the actor-in-question has a stable underlying trait(s) that matches (and potentially 
even caused) this particular behavior, an attribution that Uleman (2008) would characterize as a 
‘spontaneous trait inference’ (STI) (Dweck, 1995; Uleman et al., 2008; Chiu et al., 1997; Uleman 2015). 
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Chiu & Dweck, et al. (1997) also observed that entity theorists were less understanding of behavior that 
deviates from role expectations (Chiu et al. 1997). Incremental theorists, alternatively, were inclined to 
focus on the situational and psychological mediators (in immediate situations and across contexts), such as 
goals/feelings/states of mind, when making judgments of others’ behaviors (Dweck et al., 1995). 
Additionally, they were also more tolerant of deviant behavior if it served the agenda of a personal right or 
freedom (Chiu et al., 1997). In sum, these studies imply that entity theorists may attain a greater sense of 
‘who someone is’ from first impressions and with very little situational detail. Incremental theorists’ 
judgments may have an advantage when given behavior to examine over time and across various contexts, 
using what McConnell (2001) would call ‘memory-based’ judgments. However, Dweck clarifies that the 
entity ‘on-line’ judgments advantage may work best only when the target truly fits a stereotype or when 
there is no situational information that would create dissonance with a simple trait assignment (McConnell, 
2001; Chiu et al., 1997).  
In 2001, McConnell designed both correlational and experimental paradigms, in which he 
manipulated participants’ implicit theories, to understand the association between personality implicit 
theories effects on social judgment. As mentioned previously, his studies suggested that perceivers vary 
systematically in their readiness to form on-line and memory-based judgments (McConnell, 2001). He 
explains that incremental theorists, for example, will not always form memory-based evaluations. Instead, 
attributions and judgments, are affected by both situational variables (in the vignettes) and perceiver-
relevant variables (cognitive load, processing goals, and time constraints/delays) (McConnell, 2001). 
Lastly, his results largely demonstrate that entity theorists appear to spend more cognitive effort in forming 
superficial evaluative impressions of the social targets, while incremental theorists use their cognitive 
resources on the situational information and/or the transient features of the actor, such as the actor’s goals 
and mental state (McConnell, 2001). Incrementalists make more objective inferences by seeking 
situationally-appropriate rather than dispositionally apposite information and, therefore, make attributions 
that rely less on stereotypes (Miller, 2007; Dweck, 1996; Gervey, Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1999). These 
findings replicate the trait-focused vs. mediator-focused duality that Dweck and colleagues established 
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previously (Dweck et al. 1995; Chiu et al. 1997), and also the ‘contextualist’ nature of lay intuitions that 
experimental philosophers have elucidated in the context of moral judgment (i.e. that implicit beliefs can 
be manipulated experimentally) (Chiu et al., 1997, McConnell, 2001; Weinberg et al., 2001; Woolfolk et 
al., 2006). Consequently, even in the domain of cognition, an implicit theory bias can be (at least 
temporarily) attenuated and affected by the activation of its counterpart theory via exposure and learning. 
This transient inducement of a theory can actually change the theory-relevant epistemic vectors that become 
meaningful to a participant during social inferences and judgment (Molden, Plaks, & Dweck, 2006). The 
entity theorists tend to focus primarily on the trait inferences that may match the negative behavior, while 
incrementalists attend to the situational and psychological variables that may have caused the behavior.  
 However, Molden, Plaks, & Dweck (2006) demonstrated some seemingly contradictory results. 
They found that when entity and incremental theorists possessed their full cognitive resources (no cognitive 
load constraints, for example) the participants did not differ in their judgments of behavior (Molden et al. 
2006). However, in this study’s paradigm, the vignettes were crafted specifically to provide information 
that conflicted with simple trait vs. situational attribution of target’s behaviors so as to provide alternate 
interpretations of behavior. Additionally, the researchers gave participants the specific goal of either 
forming a dispositional or situational impression (instead of just asking to ‘form an impression’ or rate on 
a ‘blameworthiness’ scale). Lastly this study was interested in examining not just behavior categorization, 
but also the situational vs. trait corrections that occur after an inference goal/behavioral categorization is 
already reached (Krull, 1993; Krull and Erickson, 1995a; Molden, et al., 2006). This ‘post-hoc’ correction 
is considered to be considerably more resource-dependent and effortful judgment task (Krull, 1993; Krull 
and Erickson, 1995a; Molden et al., 2006). Therefore, the research question in this study was looking at a 
different phase in the social perception processes than previous studies (the post-hoc judgments rather than 
the initial intuitive judgments). Molden et al., (2006) found that when entity and incremental theorists are 
presented with information that provides alternative trait and situational explanations, they may look 
beyond their preferred interpretations. Specifically, under certain conditions (cognitive load), entity 
theorists may also form stronger situational impressions and incrementalists may also form stronger 
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dispositional impressions (Molden et al., 2006). Ultimately, this doesn’t debunk previous implicit theory 
work, but in fact expands our understanding of how implicit theories function under cognitive load and 
during different phases of the judgment process. For the remainder of this paper, the moral and social 
judgments I will be referring to are those that occur due to initial inference goal categorizations, under no 
experimental cognitive load, and without conflicting trait and situational information. 
 
Implicit Theories of Emotion and Social Judgment 
 
In their research Miller, Burgoon, & Hall (2007) manipulated implicit theories of moral character 
to understand the relationship between these theories and responses to social transgressions. What made 
this study fascinating is that, not only did Miller and colleagues (2007) look at cognitive responses, via 
attribution of ‘blameworthiness’ to transgressors, but they also looked at the link between implicit theories 
and affective responses to the socially inappropriate behaviors (Miller et al, 2007). Thus, these researchers 
recognized the relevance of emotions in implicit theory and social perception research, even if affective 
responses and not beliefs about emotions were the target variables. Although interestingly, Miller et al. 
(2007) cite Weiner and colleagues (1987; 1993) who argue that, ‘more attention should be paid to naive 
theories of emotion’ specifically (Miller, 2007; Weiner, Amirkhan, Folkes, & Verette, 1987; Weiner, 1993). 
The reason being that, since we all consciously (and subconsciously) attempt to ‘understand and influence 
the emotions of others, the average person must use implicitly held rules or laws related to feeling states’ 
in social situations (Miller, 2007; Weiner et al., 1987; Weiner, 1993). The results of the Miller et al. (2007) 
study demonstrate that entity theorists respond to actors’ transgressive behaviors with augmented levels of 
negative affect, and they tend to rate the actors more harshly than incremental theorists (Miller, 2007). The 
theoretical implication given by Miller and colleagues is that because transgressive episodes cause more 
negative affect in entity theorists, these individuals will rely on dispositional information, an easier 
alternative to the cognitively taxing strategy of analyzing context and psychological mediators (Miller, 
2007).  However, the direction (and precise location) of affect mediation in this experiment is not entirely 
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clear. It’s also possible that the negative affect is caused by the judgment itself (i.e. the act of blaming 
someone harshly itself makes you feel angry). In fact, attributions of blame are critical in the generation of 
angry and aggressive behavior (Scherer, Schorr, Johnstone, 2001; Weiner, 1995). But, the intuitionist 
models in moral psychology posit that moral intuitions and moral emotions come first and directly cause 
moral judgments (Haidt, 2001; Scweder & Haidt, 1993; JQ Wilson, 1993). So, what might be happening is 
that after perceiving the transgressive behavior, moral implicit theories (along with negative affect) bias the 
salience of dispositional or situational information. This information then affects intentionality inferences, 
which finally affect judgment [e.g. blame rating]. And subsequently, the judgment itself may 
perpetuate/augment/attenuate the negative feelings. Future research in this area is needed to determine the 
precise relationship of affect responses to judgment, as moderators, mediators, and/or outcome variables. 
Nevertheless, a connection between emotions and social attributions is apparent. Emotions (generally) seem 
to be domain-relevant in the realm of implicit theories and social cognition. Now, if our affective responses 
may be biasing our inferences and attributions, how is our emotion knowledge impacting social judgment?  
 Lisa Feldman Barrett elegantly explicates the association between lay emotion knowledge and 
behavior interpretation when she states, ‘It is not difficult to imagine how the experience of seeing anger in 
another person might result when knowledge about anger [and emotions in general] shapes the 
conceptualization of a person’s ongoing behavior’ (Barrett, 2006). She then cites Gilbert’s (1998) assertion 
that, ‘observers identify behavioral actions in terms of the target’s intentions, which gives meaning to the 
behavioral act’ (Barrett, 2006; Gilbert 1998). Thus, observers need to solve the ‘intention problem’(how 
intentional was the actor’s behavior?) in order to categorize behaviors (and judge them). Barrett argues 
that knowledge about emotions, specifically, aids in forming these inferences (Barrett, 2006). It is possible 
that emotion implicit theories will bias intentionality inferences to align with either situational (presumably 
incremental theory) or dispositional/ trait-based (presumably entity theory) categorizations of behavior, and 
thus driving judgment. Upon seeing a woman repeatedly kick a wall, an entity theorist for example, may 
quickly and effortlessly attribute this behavior to the woman’s generally rageful disposition (a spontaneous 
trait inference, STI) (Barrett, 2006; Uleman et al., 2008). Thus, the ascribed intention is closely linked to a 
 18 
perception that this woman has a stable emotional trait (Barrett, 2006; Uleman et al., 2008). Here, an entity 
theorist’s belief that emotions are stable, ‘trait-like’, and not very malleable, may drive (potentially cause) 
dispositional inferences about the woman and her actions. Alternatively, an incremental theorist believes 
that emotions are malleable and transient. The woman’s single instance of behavior cannot possibly be 
explained by an underlying emotional trait. Therefore, an incremental theorist may infer intentionality by 
assessing the situational details instead (and not primarily by making dispositional inferences). For 
example, the fact that the woman was insulted immediately before kicking the wall, may become a salient 
epistemic vector for understanding the nature of this woman’s intent, rather than a stable trait inherent to 
the woman’s character (Barrett, 2006).  In sum, it is theoretically plausible that emotion implicit theories 




Fig 2.  
Adapted from the ‘Model of Social Inference’ (Krull, 1993; Krull & Erickson, 1995a) to include possible effects of Implicit 




 How does all of this tie into judgment? Most moral philosophers and social psychologists agree 
that judgment attributions are influenced most by an actor’s perceived causal role in a behavior (Alicke, 
2000; Weiner, 1995; Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, Doherty, 1994). Consequently, responsibility 
will be ascribed to an actor to the extent that the behavior is under the actor’s personal control (the actor 
demonstrated intentionality and foreseeability over their actions and the action’s consequences) (Alicke, 
2000; Weiner, 1995; Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, Doherty, 1994). In other words, ‘if a behavior 
is caused by factors outside of the actor’s control [and the behavior is not explicitly intended by the actor], 
then the actor is not morally responsible for that behavior’ and will ascribe less blame to outcomes 
(Woolfolk et al., 2006). So let’s bring this back to implicit theories of emotion and social judgment. 
Assuming that there is an association between these constructs, and emotion intuitions are domain-
relevant, then there are several plausible hypotheses.  
Using the logic above, the first hypothesis is that since incremental theorists perceive emotions as 
controllable, they may attribute more emotional intentionality to the actor, and thus judge the actor harshly 
(Alicke, 2000; Weiner, 1995; Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, Doherty, 1994). To clarify, if an actor 
can ‘control their emotions’ then they should be able to regulate their emotions, and consequently, their 
behavior. Conversely, because entity theorists believe that emotions cannot be controlled and are not 
malleable, it follows that entity theorists will ascribe less blame and responsibility to target’s negative 
behaviors than incremental theorists [who believe that emotions can be controlled] (Alicke, 2000; Weiner, 
1995; Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, Doherty, 1994). For entity theorists, the woman [from the 
example above] cannot be blamed for kicking the wall because she can’t control her angry emotions and, 
thus, her angry actions. In this case, STIs do not drive harsh judgment…it is the notion of ‘control’ that 
drives judgment. This could be due to the ontological distinction between emotions and psychological 
attributes (traits). Because emotions are seen as ‘more ephemeral and malleable’ than psychological 
attributes, even entity theorists’ judgment inferences may not be based on actor traits or dispositions. This 
runs counter to the way implicit theories of psychological attributes drive judgment. Implicit knowledge 
about psychological traits propagates (mostly for Entity theorists) inferences about dispositions and 
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underlying traits (driving the subsequent judgment), but implicit knowledge about transient mental states 
(emotions) propagates inferences based on perceived control (or lack thereof) for both entity and 
incremental theorists (Alicke, 2000; Weiner, 1995; Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, Doherty, 1994). 
This hypothesis would be a complete pivot from all of the prior research conducted by Chiu, Dweck, and 
others in this realm.  
The extant research leads us to a second hypothesis: entity theorists will actually be harsher in their 
attribution of blame than incremental theorists. In light of the implicit theory and social cognition research 
discussed earlier, this hypothesis has more empirical support than the first. The reasoning here is that since 
entity theorists are more likely to make trait attributions [in general], they may believe that the behavior is 
indicative of the actor’s ‘habitually negative emotional self’. Additionally, entity theorists view behavior 
as diagnostic and predictive of analogous behavior in future contexts, whereas incrementalists don’t (Chiu 
et al., 1994; Dweck et al., 1995). So, even though the actor can’t control their emotions, he/she is a person 
with inherently ‘bad emotional character’, who will probably continue to perform similar emotionally 
driven behaviors, and should thus be judged critically for it. Incremental theorists, however, view emotions 
as malleable and controllable, and so the emotionally-driven behavior is just one manifestation of reactivity 
that is contextually entangled and does not need to happen again. Another, perhaps more intriguing 
possibility, is that very strong entity theorists of emotion may view emotions as being more like ‘traits’ and 
not at all like mental states. Thus, they conceptually categorize emotions as being akin to ‘psychological 
attributes’ (a robust ontological misconception), consequently their emotion knowledge affects judgment 
in the way that implicit knowledge about traits like ‘intelligence’, ‘morality’, or ‘personality’ would 
(Lakoff, 1987; Chi, 2008).   
 Nevertheless, the actual relationship between emotion knowledge and judgment is most likely not 
this straightforward. Inferences and attributions will change according to the kinds of vignettes participants 
are exposed to, cognitive load, the stage of social judgment (post-hoc corrections and reasoning), etc. 
Additionally, there are probably many psychological mediators and moderators involved in the nomological 
network. Variables such as emotion regulation tendencies, emotion regulation self-efficacy, baseline affect, 
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the perceived importance of emotion regulation, and the perceived separation between emotions and 
behavior can all conceivably interact with emotion intuitions in the model. In short, there is plenty of 
empirical work to be done here, and there are many exciting potential interdisciplinary research trajectories.  
 
Nomological Associations: Implicit Theories of Emotion and Emotion Regulation 
 
A framework that elucidates the role of conceptual emotion knowledge in emotion generation and 
regulation is Lisa Feldman Barrett’s ‘Situated Conceptualization’ theory (Barrett, Mendenhall, Barsalou, 
2014). In this framework, emotions emerge out of a recursive and continually modified process that makes 
sensory inputs meaningful (Barrett et al. 2014). In an ongoing and constructive fashion, the brain receives 
sensory input, interoceptive sensations, and conceptual knowledge, and combines these variables to create 
situated conceptualizations (Barrett et al. 2014). Thus, knowledge itself is a variable that contributes to the 
top-down appraisals of stimuli, which then give rise to emotions (John et al. 2007; Barrett, Ochsner, Gross, 
2007; Barrett, 2006; Barrett et al. 2014; Ochsner & Gross, 2009; Ochsner, Ray, Hughes, McRae, Cooper, 
Weber, Gabrieli, Gross, 2009). And since emotion regulation describes the changes between consecutive 
situated conceptualizations, emotion beliefs/knowledge, and thus emotion implicit theories, fundamentally 
impact regulation too (Barrett et al. 2014). Wranik, Barrett, and Salovey (2007) support this perspective by 
explicating that, “appraisals reflect the conceptual knowledge (both conscious and unconscious) that an 
individual has about the self, the context, and emotions in general” (Wranik, Barrett, Salovey, 2007). 
Consequently, lay emotion knowledge contributes to the ‘top-down’ information that integrates with 
bottom-up phenomenology to create emotional episodes and drives the regulation of these episodes 
(Wranik, Barrett, Salovey, 2007).  
Gross and colleagues (2007) believe that lay emotion theories influence regulation via self-efficacy 
mediation (John & Gross, 2007). He explains that individuals who intuit that emotions generally can’t be 
controlled will ‘likely apply these beliefs to their own emotions too’ (John et al. 2007). If entity theorists 
believe that they are destined to fail at self-regulating because emotions cannot be controlled, then this will 
attenuate the confidence individuals have in themselves and, thus, there will be little motivation to spend 
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resources on emotion regulation strategies (John et al. 2007). On the other hand, incremental theorists who 
believe that emotions are generally malleable are more likely to modify their emotions because they have 
assurance in their regulation abilities (John et al. 2007). Following this logic, those that hold an incremental 
theory are more likely to spend cognitive resources in order to modify their emotional states. It appears that 
internal locus of control and achievement motivation are elements that contribute to regulation, and that 
these factors stem from underlying intuitions of emotion controllability and malleability (John et al. 2007). 
But what does the research say? 
As mentioned earlier, Miller and colleagues (2007) demonstrated that having an entity theory tends 
to generate more negative affect during social judgment than holding an incremental theory. Additionally, 
Kappes & Shikowski (2013) measured implicit theories of emotion and exposed participants to an 
unpleasant movie clip. They then correlated the emotion theories with negative affect while watching the 
clip and avoidance of the affective stimuli (Kappes et al. 2013). They found that implicit theories 
significantly predicted all of these outcome variables. Endorsing entity intuitions about emotions was 
associated with more negative affect during the movie, attentional deployment away from the clip, and 
subjects were less likely to watch the same clip again to learn about how the scene actually ends (Kappes 
et al. 2013). In this experiment, the negative stimulus was a movie, while in the previously discussed social 
perception studies, the negative stimulus was a behavioral scenario. Thus, we see a parallel tendency for 
entity theorists to disengage from the negatively affecting stimuli (Schroder et al., 2015). To illustrate, in 
Kappes & Shikowski (2013) subjects turned away from the movie clip to escape the increased negative 
affect associated with an entity theory. In Miller et al. (2007) entity theorists (also influenced by negative 
affect) defaulted to trait attributions, thereby avoiding the extra situational attention needed to sift through 
various epistemic vectors. This attentional deployment, may be akin to the Dweckian observation that entity 
wielding children usually disengage during challenging tasks and avoid future challenges (Schroder et al. 
2015; Gross & Thompson 2007). Consequently, the empirical evidence indicates that lay theories of 
emotion play an important role in how people manage their negative emotions and handle challenging 
situations (Kappes & Shikowski, 2013; Miller et al. 2007; Schroder et al. 2015; Gross & Thompson, 2007).  
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 Other implicit theories studies also tackled regulation, but they did it by using the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) to operationalize regulation tendencies (Tamir et al. 2007; Schroder et al. 
2015; Gross & John, 2013). In these studies, emotion implicit theories were repeatedly correlated with 
cognitive reappraisal, but not with emotion suppression (Tamir et al. 2007; Schroder et al. 2015; Gross & 
John, 2013). To clarify, wielding incremental emotion theories was associated with more frequent self-
reported use of cognitive reappraisal, while entity-dominant subjects are less likely to use this antecedent-
focused strategy (Tamir et al. 2007; Schroder et al. 2015; Gross & John, 2013). Emotion suppression, which 
is a response-focused regulation strategy, was not significantly correlated with implicit theories of emotion 
(Tamir et al. 2007; Schroder et al. 2015; Gross & John, 2013). So, when we examine the cumulative 
evidence thus far, we see that knowledge about emotion controllability and malleability seems to be 
associated with antecedent-focused regulation (attentional deployment & cognitive reappraisal), with 
entity theorists using attention deployment as a strategy and incremental theorists adopting cognitive 
reappraisal as a regulation strategy (Kappes et al. 2013; Tamir et al. 2007; Schroder et al. 2015; Gross & 
John, 2013).  
 In the context of social cognition and emotion knowledge, the extant research points to a fascinating 
nomological role of emotion regulation. The evidence indicates that those who have the cognitive resources 
to reappraise their emotions more frequently, tend to be the individuals that also have the cognitive 
resources and motivation to evaluate the situational and psychological epistemic vectors that may be 
contributing to behavior (Incremental theory), rather than simply interpreting behaviors by defaulting to 
trait-like inferences (Entity theory). These individuals are inclined to be less harsh in their judgments as 
they consider things like context and the actor’s goals, needs, and desires. So, according to my hypothesis 
2 which aligns with Dweck’s psychological trait research, a person’s seemingly angry behavior is not 
characteristic of his enduring curmudgeonly self, but the behavior is as fleeting and contextually entangled 
as the ephemeral and ever-changing emotions themselves. Those who default to trait-like inferences also 
appear to harbor more negative affect, and consequently attribute more blame to the actors. The 
dispositional entity strategy presumably requires less attentional, and overall cognitive, resources than the 
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incremental strategy of searching for and evaluating mediators. But because entity theorists aren’t 
considering things like context and the actor’s immediate mental state, they are missing out on the 
opportunity to consider alternatives to trait inferences, and thus, the opportunity to judge less intensely. 
However, this relationship between emotion beliefs and social judgment is still purely speculative in nature 
and needs to be proven empirically. What we do know from extant research is that having an incremental 
theory is associated with frequent use of cognitive reappraisal (emotions), cognitively complex behavioral 
inference strategies during judgment (moral character; personality; intelligence), and sustained 
engagement with negatively affecting stimuli (emotions; moral character). An entity theory is associated 
with less frequent use of cognitive reappraisal (emotions), less cognitively complex strategies during 
judgment (moral character; personality; intelligence), and a tendency to divert attention away from 
negatively affecting stimuli (emotions; moral character) (Kappes et al. 2013; Tamir et al. 2007; Schroder 
et al. 2015; Gross & John, 2013; Miller et al. 2007). However, it is possible that we may see a different 
relationship between implicit theories of emotion and social judgment (entity theorist may blame less 
harshly than incremental theorists), perhaps due to the ontological difference between psychological traits 
and mental states. Once a correlation between implicit theories of emotion and social judgment is specified, 
the exact moderator/mediator role of variables such as emotion regulation tendencies will be a valid and 
necessary follow-up investigation.  
Additionally, a significant determinant of behavior categorization and judgment appears to be 
motivation, which is influenced by the underlying emotion intuitions. If an entity theorist quickly and 
effortlessly concludes that a behavior is indicative of an enduring emotional or moral trait, then, he/she may 
be less likely to take the extra cognitive step of evaluating the context because they already have an 
immediately salient answer to the ‘intention problem’. However, since the incremental theorist is less 
burdened by negative affect and doesn’t rely on simple dispositional answers to the ‘intention problem’, he 
or she may have the motivation to consider how other variables factor into an actor’s behavior.  
 All of this nomological mapping is both theoretical and speculative. It is based on previous research 
and theory (giving more weight to hypothesis 2). However, what is clear is that future studies should 
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consider potential mediators and moderators when analyzing the relationship between implicit theories of 
emotion and social cognition. Based on extant research, negative affect, emotion regulation strategies, and 
perceived emotion regulation efficacy appear to be good places to start.  
 
Projected Pedagogical Implications 
 
 The above perspective has significant implications for interventions in the educational and clinical 
spheres. Previous implicit theories intervention studies have demonstrated that the experimental induction 
of an incremental theory leads to improvements in academic achievement (intelligence domain), 
interpersonal relations (personality domain), and to a preference for therapy over pharmaceutical 
interventions (emotions domain) (Schroder et al. 2015; Blackwell et al. 2007; Yeager et al. 2014; Yeager 
et al. 2011; Burnette et al. 2013; Miu and Yeager 2014; Walton 2014). Emotion Incremental theorists are 
also associated with having less severe depression and anxiety symptoms, better interpersonal relationships, 
and also with achieving higher scores on tests of emotional intelligence such as the MSCEIT (Schroder et 
al. 2015; Cabello, 2015; Tamir, 2007). Additionally, individuals who hold incremental emotion theories are 
associated with a habitual use of cognitive reappraisal, a regulation strategy that has generally been found 
to lead to better psychosocial and clinical outcomes (John, 2013; Tamir, 2007; but see Bonanno & Burton, 
(2013) for an alternative viewpoint). Lastly, this paper has made the theoretical prediction (hypothesis 2) 
that incremental theorists may also look beyond trait features during behavioral categorizations and attribute 
less blame to actors who perform negative behaviors. Consequently, a logical pedagogical and clinical 
intervention may be to teach the incremental theory of emotion: emotions can be controlled and are 
malleable. 
 However, this may not be the ideal intervention strategy, particularly in an educational setting. 
Dweck and colleagues have posited that neither implicit theory is objectively ‘better’ or more adaptive 
(within domains and across all domains) (Dweck et al. 1995; Chiu et al. 1997). The benefits or costs of 
these intuitions would realize themselves differently across various situations. Additionally, educators 
should use what is scientifically known about emotions and emotion generation to direct their pedagogical 
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strategies. First, there is a tendency to ontologically mislabel emotions as ‘entities’, thereby skewing some 
students’ perceptions of them toward the entity theory (Barrett, 2006; Lakoff, 1987; Chi, 2008). 
Contemporary emotion experts have postulated that emotions are neither entities nor attributes, but ‘mental 
states’, which inherently differ in their temporality (Barrett 2006; Barrett et al. 2013). Therefore, my first 
recommendation would be to correct this robust misconception. Emotions are transient mental states that 
are always in flux. Therefore, instruction that highlights this aspect of emotions is critical. My second 
recommendation is to teach that, not only are emotions mental states, but that they are mental states that 
emerge out of a multitude of underlying mental processes (Barrett 2006; Barrett et al. 2013; Ochsner et al. 
2009; Ochsner et al. 2009; Roseman & Smith, 2001). There are causal principles that drive emotion 
generation and phenomenology (Barrett 2006; Barrett et al. 2013; Ochsner et al. 2009; Ochsner et al. 2009; 
Roseman & Smith, 2001). Teaching these underlying principles, including fundamental concepts such as 
appraisal and reappraisal, would help convey the fact that emotions are neither completely controllable nor 
completely out of our control (John et al. 2007; Barrett, Ochsner, Gross, 2007; Barrett, 2006; Barrett et al. 
2013; Ochsner & Gross, 2009; Ochsner, Ray, Hughes, McRae, Cooper, Weber, Gabrieli, Gross, 2009). This 
highlights the potentially misleading effects of relying on an isolated incremental emotion theory 
intervention. The incremental theory posits that emotions are controllable, when in fact expert theories from 
affect science strongly suggest that there are only some aspects of the emotion system that we have 
volitional control over (John et al. 2007; Barrett, Ochsner, Gross, 2007; Barrett, 2006; Barrett et al. 2013; 
Ochsner & Gross, 2009; Ochsner, Ray, Hughes, McRae, Cooper, Weber, Gabrieli, Gross, 2009). In sum, 
using the incremental theory as an intervention may prove to be overly reductive as it does not 
comprehensively address how emotions truly function in the human body and mind. For example, initial 
emotion appraisals happen quickly and automatically, while our emotion reappraisals are a regulation 
strategy that we do have volitional control over (John, 2013; Bonanno and Burton 2013; Ochsner & Gross, 
2009. Teaching the human emotion system (HES) and its central principles in its entirety (or something 
close to it) would have the effect of providing students with a more complex, scientific, and comprehensive 
emotion mental model of emotionality. Wranik, Barrett, & Salovey (2007) state that, “individuals with 
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complex emotion knowledge will perceive and adapt to a variety of emotional signals or feelings and will 
probably generate more suitable plans for regulation, whereas those with less complex knowledge may be 
comparatively limited” (Wranik et al. 2007). We don’t want to make the mistake of limiting the potential 




I have made a theoretical case for the need to conduct empirical research on the relationship 
between implicit emotion theories and social judgment using Maya Tamir & John Gross’ (2007) Implicit 
Theories of Emotions Scale. Emotion lay theories are relevant to the realm of social cognition and may 
interact with variables such as negative affect, emotion regulation tendencies, perceived emotion regulation 
self-efficacy. The connection between emotion knowledge and social perception seems to be that entity and 
incremental theories of emotion implicitly establish dichotomous inference strategies for interpreting and 
judging an actor’s behavior. These diverging inference strategies ultimately lead to differences in social 
judgment. Mapping of correlational relationships will allow for the implementation of pedagogical and 
clinical interventions that can enlighten humanity to its own emotional functioning and implicit knowledge 
about emotions. To conclude, art (poetry, dance, theater, literature, visual art) allows our intuitive 
knowledge about emotions to become salient and embodied. Educational and clinical interventions can 
explicitly augment our awareness of our own emotional worlds. An interdisciplinary approach to Social-
emotional awareness by employing art, explicit classroom instruction, and clinical intervention can help 
humans consciously regulate the implicit effects of emotion knowledge. But this is no easy feat. In the 
words of John Locke, “The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, 






Chapter 2: Study 1 
 Study 1 aims to explore the relationship between Implicit Theories of Emotion and attributions of 
Blame to actors displaying negative behaviors across different scenarios. There are several possible 
outcomes for this research endeavor. First, if emotions beliefs are not related to social judgment, I expect 
to find that there is no correlation between the Implicit Theories and attribution of Blame. However, if 
Implicit Theories of Emotion are related to Social Judgment, then I expect to see that the Emotion Theories 
will be significantly correlated to attributions of Blame. Specifically, I anticipate a negative correlation 
between the Emotion theories and Blame indicating that Incremental theorists attribute less Blame to actors 
displaying transgressive behaviors than entity theorists. This hypothesis is based on previous implicit 
theories (of attributes) research findings that have indicated a tendency for Incremental Theorists (of 
Morality and Personality) to make social judgments based on situational mediators, while Entity Theorists 
tend to make judgments based on trait information. Consequently, implicit theories of emotion may set up 
diverging ‘intentionality inferences’ of the situational or dispositional kind upon perceiving actors behave 
in negative ways. This could drive differences in blame attribution.  
 
Establishing Nomological Associations  
 Additionally, a secondary goal of this study is to begin mapping a nomological network by 
proposing various other variables that might mediate and/or moderate the relationship between implicit 
theories of emotion and attribution of blame. To do this, I will conduct exploratory correlational analyses 
on the proposed variables. If these other emotion-related variables are correlated with both predictor 
variables (Implicit Theories) and outcome variables (scenario Judgments), then this will signify a 
mediational relationship. If the variables are correlated with only the predictor variables (Implicit Theories), 
then this may imply a moderation relationship. Past research that used Tamir’s (2007) scale has 
demonstrated significant correlations between Implicit Theories of Emotion and self-perceived Emotion 
Regulation Tendencies operationalized by the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) (Tamir et al. 2007; 
Livingstone, 2012; Schroder, Dawood, Yalch, Donnellan, & Moser, 2015). This study attempts to replicate 
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this relationship and, since observing an actor’s negative behaviors can be construed as that actor’s failure 
to ‘self-regulate’, we suspect that this variable could be a potential moderator (Bandura, 1986; Seligman, 
1975; Tamir et al. 2007). Additionally, emotion regulation Self-Efficacy has been shown to be a mediating 
variable with respect to implicit theories of emotion and outcomes such as emotional well-being and clinical 
symptomatology after a major life transition (Tamir et al. 2007). This variable would account for a 
participant’s belief that they are or are not efficient regulators of emotion. For this reason, I will also analyze 
emotion regulation-self efficacy’s relationship to implicit theories of emotion and attribution of blame. 
However, Tamir and colleagues found that the mediator effects of self-efficacy only occurred on outcome 
variables that had to do with ‘the self’. Mediation was lost when outcome variables that included ‘others’, 
such as peer assessment of emotional-well-being and other manifestations of social adjustment (Tamir et 
al. 2007). They then suggested that ‘other focused’ or ‘general’ beliefs about emotion-regulation might be 
better suited to social outcomes (Tamir et al. 2007). Thus, I also included another potential moderator/ 
mediator, which I call ‘Emotion Regulation Value’, because it may be better suited for my ‘other focused’ 
social judgment outcome variable. This variable is meant to capture a person’s general belief about the 
importance of humans’ capacity to emotionally self-regulate (i.e. how strongly participants agree with the 
statement: ‘How important is it for people to manage their emotions effectively?’). Consequently, I 
hypothesize that there will be a relationship between Implicit Theories of Emotion and Emotion Regulation 
Tendencies, emotion regulation Self-Efficacy, and Perceived Value of emotion regulation. I also 
hypothesize that these variables will also be related to blame attribution, which, if true, would signify that 




112 participants (58% male, 42% female; age: M= 24.22, SD= 0.66) were recruited using Amazon 
Turk. The respondents were all considered to be ‘master level’ users, which meant that they had a history 
of answering surveys completely and accurately. This digital platform is ideal for naive theory research 
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because data can be collected from a very large and diverse sample of adults across various different 
geographical regions. I asked the participants to indicate their level of exposure to psychology, which we 
took to be a proxy of prior formal education on emotions. Most people had at least some exposure to 
psychology (no exposure= 23%, some high school=10.71%, some undergraduate= 49.11%, undergraduate 
psych degree= 6.25%, some graduate= 3.57%, and graduate psych degree= 7.14%). I also asked participants 
to indicate the highest level of education achieved. All individuals had at least a high school education, and 
most had achieved an undergraduate degree (None= 0%, High School= 24.11%, Undergraduate= 41.96%, 
Graduate 33.93%). For future naive theory research, acquiring some adult participants with no high school 
education (and those who have dropped out) will be important for generalizability as there is a large 
population of adults that still, unfortunately, have little to no schooling at all.  
 
Procedure 
 Participants were given an entirely digital survey on Amazon Turk. First, I gave them a cover story, 
which explained that they would be partaking in two different and unrelated short surveys. One survey was 
related to beliefs about human emotions and the other survey wanted to collect individual’s responses to a 
database of fictional scenarios. Lastly, the participants were told that for both surveys there were no right 
or wrong answers, and that the two surveys together should be completed in one sitting. The ‘emotions 
survey’ included the Implicit Theories of Emotions Scale, The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) 
(Gross and John 2003), the emotion regulation self-efficacy item, and the emotion regulation perceived 
value item. The ‘database survey’ included twelve fictional scenarios that participants had to respond to. 
Demographic data was collected after the completion of surveys 1 and 2.  
 
Measures 
Implicit Theories of Emotions 
 To measure lay intuitions about the controllability and malleability of emotions, I employed Tamir 
et al. (2007) Implicit Theories of Emotions Scale, which was adapted from Dweck’s (1999) Implicit 
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Theories of Intelligence Scale. The scale includes two incremental items, “Everyone can learn to control 
their emotions,” “If they want to, people can change the emotions they have,” and two entity items, “No 
matter how hard they try, people can’t really change the emotions they have,” “The truth is, people have 
very little control over their emotions”. Each item was rated using a 7-point Likert scale in response to the 
task: ‘Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the statement above (1= strongly disagree; 2= 
disagree; 3= somewhat disagree; 4= neither agree nor disagree; 5= somewhat agree; 6= agree; 7= strongly 
agree). Additionally, I followed the scoring protocol of Tamir et al. (2007) by reverse scoring the two entity 
items and then averaging across all items. Therefore, higher scores indicated incremental theories and lower 
scores indicated entity theories of emotion (4 items; Cronbach’s a =.78).  
 
Scenarios for Judgment 
 I presented participants with twelve fictional scenarios. Subjects were asked to read each scenario, 
which portrayed actors displaying different negative or neutral behaviors. Then subjects were asked ‘how 
blameworthy is the [target actor] for his/her actions?’ and had to rate the actor on a 9-point Likert scale (1= 
not at all blameworthy; 9= completely blameworthy). Blameworthiness has been used to operationalize 
negative behavior judgment both in experimental philosophy lay intuitions research and in prior implicit 
theories studies (Miller, Burgoon, & Hall, 2007; Woolfolk, Doris, & Darley, 2006; Alike, 2006; Knobe, 
2006; Knobe, 2003b; Nadelhoffer, 2006). 
Four of the fictional scenarios were ‘neutral’ scenarios, which depicted an actor behaving in 
relatively ‘neutral’ ways. These scenarios were meant to capture each participant’s baseline blame 
tendencies. The rest of the 8 scenarios were ‘negative’ scenarios that portrayed actors displaying 
emotionally charged negative behaviors. Five of these ‘negative’ scenarios were grouped into the 
‘emotionally reactive’ category, and the last three scenarios were grouped into the ‘moral decision’ 
category. Emotionally Reactive scenarios were meant to portray actors in a reactive ‘heat of passion’ state, 
where the transgressive behavior is very tied to emotional action tendencies. In the Moral Decision 
scenarios, the actors clearly intended to commit the behavior and had foresight of the possible consequences 
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of their behavior. Examples of the ‘Neutral’, ‘Moral Decision (negative)’, and ‘Emotionally Reactive 
(negative)’ scenario groupings can be seen  below (12 items; Cronbach’s a = .85). All 12 of the scenarios 
can be viewed in the appendix.  
 
Neutral: ‘Sitting on a bench by a lake, a woman reads the paper. Small birds skip around nearby, looking 
for crumbs. The woman realizes that she is cold, but does not put on her jacket.’ 
 
Moral Decision [Negative]: ‘A woman sits down to take her career’s certification exam; she has failed once 
before. As she begins to answer questions, her anxiety increases steadily. She begins to peer at her 
neighbor’s answers and copy several of them. She does this continually until she finishes the exam.’ 
 
Emotionally Reactive [Negative]: ‘A man enters his apartment and notices that most of his girlfriend’s 
belongings are gone. He then hears a voicemail from her saying that she no longer loves him. The man 
begins to cry and eventually kicks the wall multiple times leaving several large holes.’ 
 
 
Emotion Regulation Tendencies 
 The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) created by Gross & John has been employed to 
operationalize emotion regulation strategy use, particularly of the antecedent-focused ‘cognitive 
reappraisal’ strategy and the response-focused ‘expressive suppression’ strategy. It is important to note that 
this questionnaire captures strategy frequency and not strategy ability (McRae, Jacobs, Ray, & Gross, 
2011).  The questionnaire contains ten items: 6 reappraisal items (e.g., “When I want to feel less negative 
emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situation”) and 4 suppression items (e.g., “When I am 
feeling negative emotions, I am careful not to express them”). To answer each item, participants are 
presented statements meant to capture a particular strategy, and with a 7 point Likert scale (1= strongly 
disagree; 4= neutral; 7= strongly agree). The Gross & John recommend that the item order should not be 
changed, and that none of the items are reversed scored (Gross & John, 2003). Reliability for the ERQ has 





Emotion Regulation Perceived Self-Efficacy and Perceived Value  
 To measure perceived emotion regulation self-efficacy, I asked participants to rate, on a 7-point 
Likert scale, the extent to which they agree with the statement ‘I am very good at managing my emotions” 
(1= Strongly Disagree; 4= Neither agree nor disagree’ 7= Strongly Agree). To measure perceived emotion 
regulation value I asked participants to rate, also on a 7-point Likert scale, the extent to which they agree 
with the general statement: ‘It is important to manage emotions effectively’ (1= Strongly Disagree; 4= 
Neither agree nor disagree’ 7= Strongly Agree). Reliability cannot be calculated on scales containing less 
than three items, therefore a reliability score was not calculated. This is a self-acknowledged study 
limitation and future studies should include more items for both perceived self-efficacy and value.  
 
RESULTS 
Part 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 As demonstrated in previous studies, participants tended to view emotions as being more malleable, 
thus displaying slightly more incremental theories (M= 5.1, SD= 1.1, range= 1-7) than entity theories. This 




























Fig 3. Frequency histogram of the Implicit Theories of Emotions Scores (higher scores indicate an Incremental Theory; 
lower scores indicate an Entity Theory). These scores reflect participants’ self-perceived Implicit Theory prior to 




From figure 3, we can see that there is a left skewed, bimodal distribution of implicit theories scores. There 
are spokes at scores of 3.5, 4.2, 5.0, 5.2, 6.0, and 6.2. In general, we can see that there is a higher proportion 
of Incremental theorists to Entity theorists. While there are some very strong Incremental theorists (score 
of 7.0), there is a lack of very Strong Entity theorists (scores below 2.0).  
 
Moral decision vignettes were rated more harshly than the Emotionally Reactive vignettes and the 
neutral vignettes. (Moral Decision: M= 7.65, SD= 1.34, range= 1-9; Emotionally Reactive: M= 6.52, SD= 
1.57, range= 1-9; Neutral: M= 4.98, SD= 2.60, range= 1-9). The difference between these two types of 
negative scenarios (Emotionally Reactive and Morally Decision), as indicated by a paired-samples t-test, 
was significant (t(112)= 7.67, p< .05, |d|= .4), which implies that the respondents actually perceived these 
two types of scenarios as being different, and also indicates that I successfully created a semantic difference 
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when writing the vignettes. The Emotionally Reactive Scenarios and Moral Decision blame means were 
also both significantly different from the Neutral scenario means (Emotionally Reactive & Neutral: t(112)= 
7.21, p <.05, |d|=.7; Moral Decision & Neutral: t(112)= 11.21, p< .05, |d|=1.0). The relationships between 
all of the judgment scenarios can be viewed below in figure 4.  
 











Part 2: Correlation Matrix 
Table 1. Bivariate Correlations for Study 1.  Implicit Theories of Emotions were scored to reflect the incremental theory***. 
The ERQ is the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, ‘ER’ refers to Emotion Regulation, and ‘All Negative’ refers to Emotionally 
Reactive and Moral Decision vignettes grouped together.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
 Table 1 presents the correlations among implicit theories of emotion and the various judgment 
scenarios and emotion regulation variables. There was a significant correlation between implicit theories 
of emotion and the Negative Scenarios (Emotionally Reactive + Moral Decision), and therefore confirms 
the hypothesis that these implicit theories are domain relevant with respect to social judgment (r= .194, p< 
.05). However, the correlation was positive, which is inconsistent with previous implicit theories (of 
psychological attributes) studies that demonstrate entity theorists blaming more harshly (negative 
correlation). Since the Implicit Theories of Emotions variable was scored to reflect the Incremental theory, 
we are seeing the reverse relationship, that incremental theorists are attributing more blame to actors who 
behavior negatively. Additionally, while there was a significant correlation between implicit theories of 
emotion and all negative scenarios, when looking at the sub-groups, there was a significant correlation with 
the Moral Decision scenarios (r=.217, p<.05) and no significant relationship between the implicit theories 
and Emotionally Reactive scenarios. To see if any outliers are creating the effect of significance, 
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(Figures 5 and 6 below). These scatterplots contain a ‘jitter’ to reflect a more accurate visual representation 
of the data trends. 
 
Fig 5. Scatterplot of the significant relationship between Implicit Theories of Emotions and Blame for the Moral Decision 






There is a clear Incremental Theory outlier at an implicit theories score of 6.0, but this outlier would actually 
be pulling the relationship in the opposite direction of my significant trend. So, it doesn’t seem like this 
outlier is responsible for pulling the correlation toward significance. We can also see from this scatterplot, 
that the relationship between these variables is not very linear. Additionally, the data are aggregated towards 
the top right corner of the scatterplot. Therefore, as the correlations indicate, being an incremental theorist 
(above a score of 4.0) is associated with placing more blame on the Moral Decision scenarios. The stronger 
the incremental theory, the higher the blame score.  
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Fig 6. Scatterplot of the non-significant relationship between Implicit Theories of Emotion and Blame for the Negative 





Figure 6 represents the non-significant relationship between Implicit Theories of Emotion and the 
Emotionally Reactive scenarios. Comparing this scatterplot to the one in figure 5, we see that the points are 
more spread out and less ‘grouped’ toward the upper right quadrant of the graph. Again, there are a few 
outliers, but they aren’t creating a trend because the relationship between these variables is not statistically 
significant.   
This study also replicated the significant relationship between implicit theories of emotion and 
habitual cognitive reappraisal tendencies (r= .383, p<.01) and the non-significant relationship with 
expressive suppression tendencies shown in past research (Tamir et al., 2007; Schroder et al. 2015). Other 
replicated findings included the significant relationship between implicit theories of emotion and emotion 
regulation self-efficacy (r= .320, p<.01), and between cognitive reappraisal and emotion regulation self-
efficacy (r= .352, p<.01) (Tamir et al. 2007). Additionally, emotion regulation value (how much participants 
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valued emotion regulation generally) was significantly correlated with both implicit theory of emotions (r= 
2.86, p<.01) and tendency to use cognitive reappraisal (r= .285, p<.01). Therefore, in addition to attributing 
more blame, incremental theorists were associated with habitual use of cognitive reappraisal, having higher 
perceived regulation self-efficacy, and believing that emotion regulation is important.   
 The constructs of emotion regulation value and self-efficacy were both not significantly correlated 
with any of the neutral or negative scenarios. Likewise, reappraisal and suppression strategies were both 
not significantly correlated with any of the judgment scenarios. Thus, the postulated nomological variables 
appear to not be mediators in this network. However, there is still a possibility that they might be 
moderators. Future research should explore this possibility by replicating the present correlations and 
performing multiple regression analysis.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 The main findings of this study are that implicit theories of emotions are significantly correlated 
with attributions of blame, and that incremental theorists are attributing more blame to actors behaving 
negatively than entity theorists. The latter part of these results comes as a complete surprise since extant 
implicit theories of psychological attribute studies have demonstrated that entity theorists are associated 
with attributing more blame than incremental theorists. Researchers explain this previous trend by 
emphasizing that entity theorists tend to experience more negative affect when faced with negative 
scenarios, and they tend to categorize behavior by making dispositional and spontaneous trait inferences 
(Chiu et al 1997; Miller, 2007; Dweck, 1996; Gervey, Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1999; McConnell, 2001). 
Incremental theorists, however, differ in their intentionality inferences in that they focus on situational and 
psychological mediators; they also experience less negative affect and tend to attribute less blame (Chiu et 
al 1997; Miller, 2007; Dweck, 1996; Gervey, Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1999; McConnell, 2001).  
So what is causing the reverse trend in the present study? The reason appears to be that emotions 
(and other constructs like ‘thoughts’) belong to a different ontological category than intelligence, morality, 
and personality. Emotions are mental states, while the other constructs used in the implicit theories research 
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are psychological attributes. Thus it is possible that, due to the transient and ever-changing nature of mental 
states (unlike attributes which are more ‘stable’), things like underlying dispositions, traits, and maybe even 
certain situational mediators are not the principle drivers of social inference making. Instead, perhaps, the 
issue of actor ‘controllability’ becomes more relevant (for both Entity and Incremental theorists) and 
negative transgressions are seen as ‘failures to regulate’ or ‘failures to emotionally control’ (Bandura, 1986; 
Seligman, 1975; Tamir et al. 2007). As mentioned previously, perceiving others’ negative behaviors can be 
construed as that person’s failure to ‘self-regulate (Bandura, 1986; Seligman, 1975; Tamir et al. 2007).  So, 
for entity theorists, because emotions cannot be controlled and don’t really change, actors are not 
responsible for their emotionally derived behavior because they can’t regulate their emotions. In other 
words, there is less intentionality, foreseeability and physical control, and thus less blame is ascribed to the 
actor (Alicke, 2000; Knobe 2006). Conversely for incremental theorists, emotions are controllable and 
malleable, and therefore actors are viewed as responsible for regulating their emotional behavior (Alicke, 
2000; Knobe 2006). For incrementalists, the actor’s behavior is intentional because emotions can be 
controlled. This is bolstered by the significant correlations seen among implicit theories of emotion and 
‘moral decision’ scenarios, but not ‘emotionally reactive’ scenarios. Both incremental theorists and entity 
theorists might perceive the ‘emotionally reactive’ behaviors as happening in ‘the heat of the moment’, 
with little intentionality and control, whereas with the actors in ‘moral decision’ scenarios portray 
augmented intentionality since a more ‘top-down’ (although not necessarily entirely conscious) 
emotionally-driven ‘decision’ to act occurs (Haidt, 2001; Krull et al. 1995; Lerner et al. 1998; Uleman et 
al. 2008). Thus, there is a higher degree of intentionality and forseeability inherent to the moral scenarios 
that doesn’t exist in the emotionally reactive scenarios. To clarify this further, I will employ a moral 









Fig 7. Knobe’s (2006) model about the role of moral considerations in people’s concept of intentional action. The key claim of 
the model was that people’s intentional action intuitions tend to track the psychological features that are most relevant to praise 
and blame judgments. Here we propose that emotion intuitions, measured by Tamir’s implicit theories sale, tend to track the 




According to this model, not only are entity and incremental theorists sensitive to different contextual 
‘features’ during judgment within implicit theory domains (entity vs. incremental), but the present study 
indicates that categorical feature salience may also change between certain ontological domains (attributes 
vs. mental state). Here, it could be that mental state vs. psychological attribute implicit theories are 
ontologically distinct enough to perpetuate the salience of distinct epistemic vectors. For mental state 
domains, subjects’ perception of actor ‘control’ appears to drive intentionality inferences (and thus 
blameworthiness). This may take precedence over ‘attribute-type’ actor features such as underlying traits, 
dispositions, and relevant situational vectors that might be more salient in psychological attribute implicit 
theory domains. To clarify, in the domain of emotion implicit theories an actor’s personal ‘control’ over 
their emotions and behaviors drives the tendency to blame harshly, whereas in the domain of psychological 
attributes theories ‘dispositional and trait’ inferences drive the tendency to blame harshly. However, this is 
just an inductive extrapolation of the data. In order to make empirical claims about the effects of implicit 
theories across ontological categories, a new study must be created in which both kinds of implicit theories 
are included (psychological attributes and mental states).   
 Another interesting finding was the correlation relationships among implicit theories and all of the 
emotion regulation variables. According to this study, incremental theorists are associated with more 
frequent use of cognitive reappraisal strategies, have higher emotion regulation self-efficacy, and also 
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perceive emotion regulation as being generally important. With respect to social judgment, this makes 
sense. If someone uses more cognitively complex regulation strategies, believes they are competent 
emotional self-regulations, and views regulation as being generally important, then it is logical that they 
would attribute more blame to those behaving negatively. This is likely due to the fact that incremental 
theorists may perceive transgressive behavior as a ‘decision not to regulate’ since emotions are ‘mental 
states that can be controlled’ (Bandura, 1986; Seligman, 1975; Tamir et al. 2007). On the other hand, if 
someone is less likely to use a cognitively complex strategy like reappraisal, believes that they are 
incompetent at self-regulating, and views emotion regulation as not being very important, then it is also 
logical that they might not attribute much blame to actors transgressively behaving. Entity theorists 
probably do not view negative behavior as a ‘decision not to regulate’, since people can’t really volitionally 
regulate to begin with (Bandura, 1986; Seligman, 1975; Tamir et al. 2007).  
 Lastly as mentioned in the results, because emotion regulation strategies, self-efficacy, and value 
were not significantly correlated with any of the neutral or negative (moral or emotionally reactive) 
judgment scenarios (outcome variables), this is an indication that none of these variables are mediators in 
the nomological network of implicit theories of emotion and social judgment. Therefore, these variables 
will be dropped for Study 2 of this dissertation. However, it is possible that these constructs act as 
moderators, and this relationship should be explored in future research.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 A limitation of this study is that it was purely a correlative exploration. Therefore, I did not establish 
causality. Additionally, the correlations are significant, but small (even though they’re in approximately the 
same order of magnitude as the correlations in Tamir et al., 2007 and Schroder et al., 2015).  Future studies 
should manipulate implicit theories of emotion by temporarily imbuing subjects with either an incremental 
or entity theory and then exposing them to scenarios for judgment (Dweck, 1995, Chiu et al. 1997), thereby 
bolstering the theoretical and empirical claims made by this correlational analysis. This manipulation has 
yet to be attempted in the domain of implicit theories of emotion.  Additionally, the present study only 
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analyzed the relationship between implicit emotion knowledge and negative behaviors. It is possible that 
positive behaviors may bias the salience of different epistemic vectors during intentionality analysis and 
ultimately social judgment (Knobe, 2006). Also, one could argue that these particular scenarios do not have 
ecological validity, implying that our scenarios are ‘observational’ snapshots of situations rather than face-
to-face situations that may have more longitudinal contextual detail. While this is a general criticism, Miller 
et al. (2007) posit that people are often very offended through indirect ‘observational’ pathways when they 
see news in the papers, on the internet (Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube), on the TV, or hear about 
stories from friends. Many of these accounts do not directly involve individuals or their peers, as is the case 
with global social or political news (Miller et al. 2007). Interestingly, this ‘superficial’ and ‘observational’ 
social-media type judgment appeared to play a particularly pertinent role in the 2016 United States 
presidential elections; constituents superficially judged candidates online via ‘status update’ ‘and 
‘Facebook/Twitter feed’ descriptions of candidate behavior. Future studies may want to manipulate 
scenarios to include actor behavior over time and maybe even face-to-face type scenarios that involve the 
use of narrative, or even video or virtual reality paradigms.  
 Lastly, an important distinction must be made about this research. My study demonstrated that 
implicit theories of emotion are related to social judgment, and that incremental theorists tend to blame 
more harshly than entity theorists when observing negative behavior. However, judgment is not punishment. 
Just because incremental theorists are attributing more blame, it does not mean that they will also prescribe 
more retributive punishment as a consequence (Chiu et al. 1997; Dweck et al. 1995). Incremental theorists 
could still be more likely to withhold punishment and choose alternative, more educational or rehabilitative 
ways of changing actor behavior (Chiu et al. 1997). This is due to their fundamental perception, as indicated 
in this study, that emotions are mental states that can be controlled and changed. Additionally, the intense 
negative affect that respondents might feel upon observing negative behaviors, indicated by the harsher 
attribution of blame than entity theorists, may actually motivate them to want to educate actors more so 
than entity theorists. Past research on implicit theories of personality has demonstrated that holding an 
entity theory is associated with a desire to ‘get back at’ actors for their transgressive behavior, and dream 
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of ways to ‘give these transgressors what they deserve’ (Yeager et al., 2011, Chiu et al., 1997, Dweck et al. 
1995). Examining the role of retributive punishment will be an important next step in implicit theories of 
emotion and social cognitive research. This will allow for the unveiling of a more comprehensive 
nomological network (and an understanding of more tangible behavioral effects), which will affect future 
emotion intuitions interventions that may manifest in social-emotional learning (SEL) curriculums and 
clinical therapy approaches.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 I have demonstrated that Implicit Theories of Emotion are related to Social Judgment in the form 
of Blame Attribution. Significant correlations appeared for the ‘Moral Decision’ negative scenarios, which 
were semantically created to have the highest level of actor intentionality, and therefore incite the highest 
blame attribution of all the scenarios. Judgment on the ‘Emotionally Reactive’ scenarios did not display a 
significant relationship with Implicit Theories, as these negative scenarios were created to have lower actor 
intentionality. Being an Incremental theorist of emotions was associated with placing harsher blame upon 
actors in the ‘Moral Decision’ scenarios than being an Entity theorist. I infer that this is due to a difference 
the way that participants are perceiving an actor’s ‘personal control’ over their emotions and behaviors. 
Participants whose lay theories suggest that emotions are ‘controllable and malleable’, may view actors’ 
negative behavior as a failure to emotionally regulate. My results do not contradict past implicit theories 
(of psychological attributes) research that has demonstrated the opposite trend in attribution of blame, that 
Entity theorists blame harshly while Incremental theorists attribute less intense blame to actors during 
judgment tasks. In fact, the results actually expand the field’s knowledge of how implicit theories are related 






Chapter 3: Study 2 
 Study 1 established that Implicit Theories of Emotion are related to Social Judgment. Specifically, 
this study demonstrated that wielding an Incremental theory of emotions was related to attributing more 
Blame to actors behaving transgressively than participants with an Entity Theory. The correlation was 
significant for all Negative transgressive scenarios when grouped together and, specifically, for the Moral 
Decision scenarios. I theorized that this pattern of blame attribution was being driven by subjects’ 
inferences of actor ‘control’ propagated by either the Entity or Incremental theory. To clarify, since 
Incremental theorists believe that humans have the ability to control and change their emotions, they may 
believe that actors chose not to regulate their emotions (but could have regulated their emotions) and, thus, 
should be blamed harshly (Alicke, 2000; Knobe, 2003; Knobe, 2006). Conversely, since Entity theorists 
intuit that humans have little control over their emotions, the target actors did not intend to behave 
negatively and, thus, should be blamed less harshly (Alicke, 2000; Knobe, 2003; Knobe, 2006). However, 
these are just potential theoretical explanations of the data. The validity of these claims requires continued 
empirical investigation. Therefore, Study 2 was created to address the specific limitations of Study 1, such 
as a lack of causality, and also to expand the scope of the research paradigm to include additional predictor 
and outcome variables.   
First, Study 2 attempted to replicate the significant correlation between Implicit theories of Emotion 
and Social Judgment found in Study 1. However, to draw conclusions about judgment differences across 
ontological categories (between mental states and psychological traits) it was necessary to include implicit 
theories of Psychological Attributes (such as Personality) and replicate the patterns found in the literature. 
The extant research has indicated that Incremental theorists of Personality attribute less blame to actors 
behaving transgressively than Entity theorists, and the results from my Study 1 demonstrate the opposite 
(Miller et al. 2007; Chiu et al. 1997; Levy et al. 1998; McConnell, 2001; Plaks et al. 2001). Therefore, in 
Study 2, I also included Chiu and Dweck’s Implicit Theories of Personality Scale (Chiu, Dweck, & Hong 
1997) in addition to Maya Tamir’s Implicit Theories of Emotions Scale. These two predictor variables 
(implicit theories of Personality and Emotion) were then correlated with the outcome variable of Blame 
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Attribution across several scenario types. I hypothesized that Incremental Emotion Theorists and Entity 
Personality Theorists would attribute more blame to actors behaving transgressively, while Entity Emotion 
Theorists and Incremental Personality Theorists would attribute less blame to these actors (Miller et al. 
2007; Chiu et al. 1997; Levy et al. 1998; McConnell, 2001; Plaks et al. 2001).  
While Study 1 demonstrated a statistically significant relationship between Implicit Theories of 
Emotions and Social Judgment, it did not establish a causal relationship between these variables. Therefore, 
Study 2 not only sought to replicate the correlations from Study 1, but it also attempted to establish causality 
by manipulating subjects’ Implicit Theories of Emotion via exposing them to ‘contrived’ scientific articles. 
The articles were intentionally crafted to temporarily shift participants’ emotion controllability and 
malleability beliefs toward either an incremental or entity theory (Miller et al. 2007 & Chiu et al. 1997; 
Levy et al. 1998; McConnell, 2001; Plaks et al. 2001). Carol Dweck and Colleagues have employed this 
method of manipulating Implicit Theories of Psychological Traits for decades, thereby demonstrating the 
transient experimental malleability of implicit theories. In fact, I modeled my ‘contrived’ scientific article 
after their specific manipulations (Miller et al. 2007; Chiu et al. 1997; Levy et al. 1998; McConnell, 2001; 
Plaks et al. 2001). The participants were further primed into entity or incremental beliefs by answering 
‘reading comprehension questions’ related to the scientific article and by providing examples of personal 
experiences when participants felt that their emotions could or could not be controlled/changed (depending 
on their assigned experimental group). This priming and manipulation check methodology has also been 
used by previous implicit theories researchers and was modelled after their specific study materials (Miller 
et al. 2007 & Chiu et al. 1997; Levy et al. 1998; McConnell, 2001; Plaks et al. 2001).   
The last major changes to Study 2’s paradigm were applied to the Judgment Scenarios. To 
understand the changes that I made, we must turn to the cognitive underpinnings of social judgment. Moral 
philosophers have posited several models of blame attribution, the most widely accepted being Alicke’s 
Culpable Control Model (CCM) (Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Alicke 2000). This model describes the 
psychological processes involved when people make ordinary evaluations and attributions of responsibility 
and blame (Alicke 2000). It rests on two assumptions: 1. That people assess potentially blameworthy actions 
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in terms of the actor’s personal control over the harmful or otherwise negative consequences; and 2. That 
people make spontaneous evaluations of these actions that encourage blame rather than mitigation (Alicke 
2000; Lagnado & Channon, 2008).  
With respect to personal control (the first assumption), there are three types: 1. Volitional Behavior 
Control-- links mental states and behavior; this addresses whether someone’s actions are freely chosen or 
compelled by internal or external forces (intentionality); 2. Causal Control—the link between behavior and 
consequences in the world; this addresses whether someone’s behavior causes consequences (physical 
causation); 3. Volitional Outcome Control—the link between mental states and outcomes—this addresses 
whether someone desired and anticipated the consequences of their actions (foresight/foreseeability) 
(Alicke 200; Lagnado & Channon, 2008). Therefore, according to this model, causality, intentionality, and 
foreseeability are the dimensions that affect our perception of an actor’s personal control, thus driving our 
blame attributions. However, a person’s perception of these dimensions is not always perfectly logical 
(Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Alicke 2000). There are lapses in rationality due to biases in our cognitive 
processing. This is where Alicke’s second assumption comes into play. He argues that the biases in our 
cognition are a result of our affective evaluations of the actors and the harmful events they cause. These 
evaluations are said to be less consciously calculated than judgments of personal control, and they can have 
both indirect and direct influences on people’s subsequent attributions of cause and blame (Alicke, Davis, 
and Pezzo 1994; Alicke 2000; Lagnado and Channon 2008; Knobe 2003; Knobe, 2006). A direct influence 
can be observed when a person responds to negative consequences of behavior without carefully 
considering the actor’s intentions or foresight. Here, blame comes before an assessment of actor control. 
On the other hand, an indirect influence is observed when emotional evaluations alter the way a person 
perceives an actor’s personal control before they ascribe blame (Lagnado & Channon, 2008; Alicke 2000). 
In this case, a person’s intentionality and foreseeability evaluations are not being bypassed (although they 
might still be affected by the emotional biases).  
Taking the CCM into consideration, I came up with four different semantic categories of judgment 
scenarios for Study 2: Emotionally Reactive, Moral Decision, Neutral, and Accidental. In the ‘Emotionally 
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Reactive’ semantic category, actors are behaving transgressively and in a very viscerally emotional manner 
but with little foresight of the future consequences of their actions (moderate to high level of intention; low 
foreseeability; physical causality is present). In the ‘Moral Decision’ category, actors are making a 
calculated decision to behave in a certain transgressive way precisely because of the potential consequences 
of that behavior (high intentionality; high foreseeability; physical causality is present). In the ‘Neutral’ 
category, actors are not behaving transgressively. They are simply carrying out benign behaviors (high 
intentionality; mid-high foreseeability; physical causality is present). The last category, ‘Accidental’, 
portrayed actors accidentally carrying out harmful actions (no intentionality; no foreseeability; physical 
causality is present). The inclusion of these four categories therefore gave me a comprehensive 
understanding of how prior implicit beliefs and the manipulation’s effects varied across different levels of 
CCM variables. The Study 2 judgment scenario categories were tested for reliability and semantic 
appropriateness in several pilot studies. The results of these pilot studies (and the logic for inclusion and 
exclusion of certain scenarios) can be found in the Appendix.   
Using the results from Study 1, I hypothesize that Implicit Theories of Emotion and Personality 
will again be related to Social Judgment. Therefore, I will find significant correlations between these 
constructs. Specifically, Incremental theorists will be associated with attributing more blame then Entity 
theorists across all the Judgment scenario types. Additionally, I hypothesize that there will be a causal 
relationship between Implicit Theories of Emotion and Social Judgment. Using the logic above, I believe 
that participants who are taught a strong Incremental theory of emotions will blame scenario actors more 










 I recruited 425 participants using the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. All respondents were 
considered ‘master level’ users, which means that they had an established history of answering surveys 
completely and accurately. This digital platform is ideal for implicit theory research because data can be 
collected from a very large and diverse sample of adults across various different geographical regions. 
Demographic information included: gender (Male 51%, Female 49%); age (21-73 years; M= 37 years); 
highest level of education achieved (elementary school 0%; high school 27.5%; undergrad 48.7%; graduate 
23.8%); and exposure to psychology (none 33.6%; high school 14.4% some undergrad 41.9%; undergrad 
degree 4.9%; graduate degree 1.9%). All data were anonymized and participants could choose to end the 
experiment whenever they wanted. Partially completed surveys were excluded from analysis.   
 
Procedure 
 Participants were given an entirely digital survey on Amazon Turk. First, participants read a cover 
story, which explained that they were about to partake in two short and unrelated surveys.  
You are invited to participate in two short surveys about human emotions and behavior. The two surveys 
are unrelated and will take a total of 14-20 minutes to complete. Each survey individually takes about 7-
10 minutes to finish. In Survey 1, you will be asked to answer questions based on your beliefs about 
personality and emotions. Then, you will read a scientific article related to these topics and respond to 
questions about the article. In survey 2, you will be asked to respond to fictional scenarios for a moral 
philosophy research database. All of your responses will be anonymized. Please take the two surveys in 
one sitting. Thank you!  
 
Survey 1 included the Implicit Theories of Emotions Scale and The Implicit Theories of Personality Scale. 
Subjects were then randomly assigned to either the Entity or Incremental ‘scientific article’ condition and 
were asked to answer questions related to the article that they received. After this, subjects were specifically 
told that they had completed Survey 1 and would be moving on to a different survey. In survey 2, subjects 
read and reacted to the 16 fictional judgment scenarios. Lastly, after the completion of Survey 1 and Survey 
2, demographic data were collected and a suspicion probe question was asked.  If participants guessed the 
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that the two surveys were actually part of one study, their data were removed from the final analyses. At 
the conclusion of the study, subjects were debriefed and compensated for their time.  
 
DEBRIEF: Now that you've finished the surveys, we can explain their true purpose! In fact, all of the 
preceding surveys were part of a single study and the scientific articles that you read were not real. We 
were interested in whether temporarily manipulating people's beliefs about emotion controllability and 
malleability might affect social cognition in the form of blame attribution. We theorized that an individual’s 
prior theories about emotion and personality might affect the efficacy of the manipulation and that the 
manipulation's effects would vary across scenarios with different levers of actor intentionality and 
foreseeability. 
 
The entire study (including all questions and manipulation materials) can be viewed in the appendix of this 
dissertation.  
 
Implicit Theories of Emotion 
To measure lay intuitions about the controllability and malleability of emotions, I employed Tamir 
et al. (2007) Implicit Theories of Emotions Scale, which was adapted from Dweck’s (1999) Implicit 
Theories of Intelligence Scale. The scale includes two incremental items, “Everyone can learn to control 
their emotions,” “If they want to, people can change the emotions they have,” and two entity items, “No 
matter how hard they try, people can’t really change the emotions they have,” “The truth is, people have 
very little control over their emotions.” Each item was rated using a 7-point Likert scale in response to the 
task: ‘Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the statement above (1= strongly disagree; 2= 
disagree; 3= somewhat disagree; 4= neither agree nor disagree; 5= somewhat agree; 6= agree; 7= strongly 
agree). Additionally, I followed the scoring protocol of Tamir et al. (2007) by reverse scoring the two entity 
items and then averaging across all items. Therefore, higher scores indicated incremental theories of 
emotion and lower scores indicated entity theories. This created implicit theories of emotion as a continuous 
variable, which was used for correlation analysis and to test assumptions for a MANCOVA analysis (4 
items; Cronbach’s a = .84). I also transformed the prior implicit theories of emotion scores into a categorical 
variable by creating a median split: Entity Theorists (score 1.0- 3.5) and Incremental Theorists (score 3.51-
7.0). The categorical variable was used for 2-factor MANCOVA analysis.  
 51 
 
Implicit Theories of Personality 
To measure intuitions about the controllability and malleability of personality, I used Chiu and 
Dweck’s Implicit Theories of Personality Scale, which has been used by the researchers in their studies for 
decades. The scale includes only entity items, and there are 3 total items, “The kind of person someone is… 
is something basic about them and it can't be changed very much.” “People can do things differently, but 
the important parts of who they are can't really be changed.” and “Everyone is a certain kind of person 
and there is not much they can do to really change that.” Each item was rated using a 7-point Likert scale 
in response to the task: ‘Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the statement above (1= strongly 
disagree; 2= disagree; 3= somewhat disagree; 4= neither agree nor disagree; 5= somewhat agree; 6= agree; 
7= strongly agree). To reflect incremental scores, I reverse scored the three entity items and then averaged 
across all items. Therefore, higher scores indicated incremental theories of personality and lower scores 
reflected entity theories. This created a continuous variable for implicit theories of personality, which was 
used for correlation analysis and to test assumptions for a MANCOVA analysis (3 items; a = .96). I also 
transformed the prior implicit theories of personality scores into a categorical variable by creating a median 
split: Entity Theorists (score 1.0- 3.5) and Incremental Theorists (score 3.51-7.0). The categorical variable 
was used for 2-factor MANCOVA analysis.  
 
Entity and Incremental ‘Contrived’ Scientific Articles  
 To establish causality, I created two ‘contrived’ scientific articles with the intention of temporarily 
shifting participants’ emotion beliefs toward the entity or incremental end of the spectrum. The articles 
were made to look like they came from a credible and popular scientific source and cited various 
neuroscience and psychology ‘studies’ from various ‘researchers’ that attended an international conference 
on Emotions and Cognition.  The two articles looked identical and were worded verbatim except for a few 
key words and phrases, which expressed that emotions are either controllable and malleable or fixed and 
cannot be controlled. Participants were randomly exposed to either the entity or incremental article, but not 
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both. In a pilot study that tested the efficacy of these articles, participants mentioned that while they thought 
the article was credible and that it altered their previously held beliefs about emotion, it’s not wise to base 
belief completely on one or two studies (the participants were also psychology graduate students at 
Columbia, thus being a bit more discerning than the general population). Therefore, the final iteration of 
the articles also mentioned and cited a ‘metanalysis’ that pooled over 200 scientific studies on the topic of 
emotion control and malleability. Additionally, to further prime subjects without solely relying on the 
articles, I included ‘reading comprehension questions’ that had participants repetitively type and choose 
answers like ‘emotions can be controlled’ or ‘emotions cannot be controlled’. Finally, depending on the 
group participants were assigned to, they were then asked to write about a time when they could or could 
not control and change their emotions. Also, they were asked to write about a time when they witnessed 
someone else being able to control or not control and change their emotions. Two of the ‘reading 
comprehension’ questions served as my manipulation check. If both of these questions were answered 
incorrectly by a subject, then that person’s data were removed from the final analyses. The questions were:  
Manipulation check question 1 (Entity and Incremental): In a sentence or two please answer, what does 
this article claim about our ability to change and control emotions?  
 
Manipulation check question 2 (Entity): True or False: This article claims that we have very little control 
over our emotions (negative emotions in particular).  
 
Manipulation check question 2 (Incremental): True or False: This article claims that we have a lot of 
control over our emotions (negative emotions in particular).  
 
For both versions of Manipulation check question 2, the correct answer was ‘True’. For manipulation check 
question 1, answers had to specifically include phrases that specifically addressed the appropriate 
incremental or entity theory of emotion according to their assigned condition. Examples of ‘incorrect’ or 
‘inadequate’ or ‘inappropriate’ answers for manipulation question 1 (from excluded participants):  
 
E.g. 1: Emotions show our habit, thoughts, and behavior.  
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E.g. 2: This article helps you to know emotion research of human and brain. The emotional life of your 
brain can be found by this article.  
 
E.g. 3: I don’t know what this article claims. I don’t care for your clumsy attempt to lead me.  
 
 
Admittedly, example #3 made me laugh. As they say, you can’t please everyone (even when it comes to 
the participants of your doctoral dissertation study).  The Entity and Incremental ‘contrived’ scientific 
articles and the rest of the ‘reading comprehension questions’ can be viewed in the appendix of this 
dissertation.  
 
Judgment Scenarios    
 After completing ‘Survey 1’ participants were told that they were about to start a new and unrelated 
‘Survey 2’. In this survey, they were exposed to 16 scenarios for judgment. The vignettes included four 
different semantic categories: Emotionally Reactive (4), Moral Decision (4), Neutral (4), and Accidental 
(4) scenarios. As a departure from study 1, I added the new category ‘Accidental’ to include a diverse range 
of dimensions such as ‘intentionality’ and ‘foreseeability’ that affect blame attribution during social 
judgment (Shaver 1986; Heider 1958; Kelley 1973; Alicke 2000; Lagnado & Channon 2008). The scenarios 
were randomized so that each participant received a different order of the four scenario kinds.   
Subjects were asked to read each scenario, which portrayed actors displaying different negative 
‘transgressive’ or neutral behaviors. Then the subjects were asked ‘how blameworthy is the [target actor] 
for his/her actions?’ and rated the actor on a 9-point Likert scale (1= not at all blameworthy; 9= completely 
blameworthy). Blameworthiness has been used to operationalize social judgment in experimental and moral 
philosophy, social psychology, and implicit theories research for its strong relationship to the constructs of 
intentionality, causality, and foreseeability (Miller, Burgoon, & Hall, 2007; Woolfolk, Doris, & Darley, 
2006; Alike, 2006; Knobe, 2006; 2003b; Nadelhoffer, 2006; Chiu et al. 1997). Theorists argue that the more 
causality, intentionality, and foreseeability an actor exhibits over his/her actions, the more blame will be 
attributed to this actor (Miller, Burgoon, & Hall, 2007; Woolfolk, Doris, & Darley, 2006; Alike, 2006; 
Knobe, 2006; 2003b; Nadelhoffer, 2006; Chiu et al. 1997). Additionally, participants’ own affective 
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reactions to an actor’s behavior and that behavior’s consequences have been tied to the construct of ‘blame’ 
as well (Alicke 2000; Lagnado & Channon 2008).  
 In Study 1, I found that implicit theories of emotions were not significantly correlated with the 
‘Neutral’ scenarios. However, I still included the ‘Neutral’ category in Study 2 for several reasons. First, 
these scenarios were meant to capture each participant’s ‘baseline’ blame tendencies. Additionally, I did 
not want to overly sensitize my subjects to negatively-valenced emotional vignettes, which could have 
skewed judgment as they advanced through the survey. Ultimately, these ‘Neutral’ scenarios served the 
purpose of re-calibrating participants’ negative affect between negative scenarios.  
 
Examples of the Judgment Scenarios can be found below (and all 16 vignettes can be found in the 
appendix):   
 
Neutral: A jogger is making his way through the park at an easy pace. It is dusk, and families are gathering 
at the picnic areas with food. The jogger looks at the time on his phones, notices that it’s been 15 minutes 
since he left home, and continues jogging.  (4 items; Cronbach’s a= .88) 
 
Moral Decision [negative]: A woman sits down to take her career’s certification exam; she has failed once 
before. As she begins to answer questions, her anxiety increases steadily. She decides to peer at her 
neighbor’s answers and copy several of them. She continues this strategy until she finishes the exam. (4 
items; Cronbach’s a= .82) 
 
Emotionally Reactive [negative]: Early one evening, a neatly dressed man runs up to a city bus station in 
hopes of being on time for an interview. The bus pulls away just as the man arrives, without taking notice of 
the man’s attempts to flag it down. Left behind and upset, the man curses at the bus driver and throws down 
his briefcase to the ground close to a few other pedestrians. (4 items; Cronbach’s a= .77) 
 
Accidental [negative]: A teenager is walking down the school hallway with several books in his hand. The 
tiles beneath his feet happen to be wet and he trips, falling on another student in front of him. They both hit 
the ground and acquire several scrapes and bruises. (4 items; Cronbach’s a= .76) 
 
 
As you can see, in the ‘Moral Decision’ category the actor makes a calculated and emotionally 
charged moral decision before behaving. The actor also has substantial foresight over the consequences of 
his/her actions. In the ‘Emotionally Reactive’ category, the actor’s behavior is very visceral and tied to 
emotional action tendencies. The actor’s foresight is not as clear as the foresight of the actors in the Moral 
Decision vignettes. Finally, in the ‘Accidental’ category, the actor physically causes the negative behavior, 
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but the behavior is an accident and therefore not intended. All 16 of the scenarios can be viewed in the 
Appendix of this dissertation.   
To prepare the Judgment Scenario Likert scores for statistical analysis, I averaged across the 
different scenarios for each semantic category. Consequently, this gave me the mean scores for each 





Part 1: Descriptive Statistics  
Implicit Theories of Emotion and Personality Means and Frequencies 
 Subjects’ prior Implicit Theories of Emotions scores indicated that they viewed emotions as being 
pretty malleable, thus displaying theories that reflected Incremental beliefs (M= 4.7, SD= 1.3, range= 1-7). 
The frequency diagram, in figure 8 below, displays that the data is skewed to the left. The distribution is 
also bimodal, and it is also non-symmetric because my sample contained less prior Entity theorists (score 




























Fig 8. Implicit Theories of Emotions Frequency Diagram. These scores reflect participants’ self-perceived Implicit Theory 





While participants’ mean theories of emotions reflected incremental beliefs, their mean prior 
implicit theories of Personality fell closer to the middle of the incremental- entity spectrum (M= 4.1, SD= 
1.7, range= 1-7). Again, we see a bimodal frequency distribution that distinguishes entity theorists from 
incremental theorists. As compared to theories of emotion, I was able to collect a more even distribution of 








Fig 9. Implicit Theories of Personality Frequency Diagram. These scores reflect participants’ self-perceived Implicit 






When comparing the two prior theories, participants tended to view emotions as being more 
malleable and controllable than personality. Given that emotions are in the ontological category of ‘mental 
states’ and not ‘psychological traits’, people’s lay theories seem to align with these categories and view 
mental states as being more mutable while perceiving traits as being more stable human qualities. The 
difference between the priors theories of Personality and Emotions was significant (t(425)= 7.93, p< .05; 















The following section is a frequency analysis of the dependent variables, which in this case are the Judgment 
Scenarios (Emotionally Reactive, Moral Decision, Neutral, and Accidental). The Q-Q plots of these 












Figure 11 shows us that, overall, subjects judged the actors in the Emotionally Reactive scenarios 
pretty harshly (M= 7.03, SD= 1.39, range= 1-9). The data are skewed to the left, and the highest frequencies 














Figure 12 demonstrates that subjects rated the actors in the Moral Decision Scenarios very harshly 
(M= 8.14; SD= 1.2; range 1-9). The data are skewed to the left, and the highest frequency of blame occurred 
around a score of 9. Whereas the frequencies in the Emotionally Reactive category seem to increase 


























For the Neutral scenarios, figure 13, we see a bimodal pattern in the frequency chart. There is a cluster of 
data around the blame score of 1 and the score of 9. However, the frequency spike at a score of 9 is sharp 










Fig 14. Frequency Diagram of Accidental Scenarios (Blame Scores).  
 
 
Overall, participants did not blame the actors harshly for the Accidental scenarios (M=3.67, SD= 
1.7, range 1-9). As seen in figure 14, the data are right skewed, and there are frequency peaks around scores 
of 3.5 and 5. The bulk of the data occurs below a blame score of 5.5.  
As predicted by Alicke’s Culpability Control Model (CCM), participants blamed actors most 
harshly in the Moral Decision scenario category (M= 8.14; SD= 1.21; range 1-9), followed by the 
Emotionally Reactive (M= 7.03; SD= 1.39; range 1-9) and Neutral (M= 4.99; SD= 2.70; range 1-9) 
scenarios and, finally, the Accidental category (M= 3.67; SD= 1.70; 1-9) had the lowest blame ratings.  
Paired t-tests were performed to make sure that there was a significant difference in the means between 
these categories: Emotionally Reactive and Moral Decision (t(425)=18.106, p< .05, |d|= .88); Neutral and 
Accidental (t(425)= 9.019, p <.05, |d|= .44); Emotionally Reactive and Neutral (t(425)= 15.889, p < .05, 
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|d|= .77); Emotionally Reactive and Accidental (t(425)= 31.645, p<.05, |d|= 1.54); Moral Decision and 
Neutral (t(425)= 23.151, p < .05, |d|= 1.12); Moral Decision and Accidental (t(425)= 38.861, p < .05, |d|= 
1.89). All six paired t-tests are significant, which means that I was successful in creating different semantic 
categories. These means can be seen below in figure 15.  
 




Part 2: Correlations Matrix 
 In the present study, I sought to replicate the correlations found in Study 1 for Implicit Theories of 
Emotions and Judgment. I also wanted to replicate the correlations found in the literature between Implicit 
Theories of Personality and Judgment. Thus, in table 2 below, we can see the results of the Spearman’s Rho 
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correlations between both types of Implicit Theories of and Judgment across the different scenario 
categories. I also included Age, Gender, Education Level, and Exposure to Psychology as variables in the 
correlation matrix to further discern the relationship between all of these variables.  
 
Table 2. Spearman’s Rho Correlation Matrix for Selected Variables. ** indicates significance at the .01 level (2-tailed) and 
* indicates significance at the .05 level (2- tailed). The Gender variable reflects Female. The first four categories 
(Emotionally Reactive, Moral Decision, Neutral, and Accidental) are the different kinds of scenarios presented to 
participants during the judgment task. ‘Ed Level’ refers to education level and ‘Psych Exposure’ refers to prior exposure 






























.007 .030 -.049 -.147** .027 .045 -.105* -.022 
 
As we saw in Study 1, wielding a prior Incremental theory of Emotions is associated with harsher 
blame placed on the actors in the Moral Decision scenarios (p < .05). Additionally, having an Incremental 
theory is related to placing more blame on actors in the Emotionally Reactive scenarios (p < .05). There 
were no significant associations between prior Implicit Theory of Emotions and Neutral or Accidental 
scenarios. Being an Incremental theorist of Emotions was also related to being older in age (p < .01). 
Scatterplots of the relationship between prior Emotion Theories and Blame attribution for the Moral 
Decision and Emotionally Reactive scenarios can be seen in figures 16 and 17 below. These scatterplots 










In figure 16, we see the data are aggregated in the upper-right hand corner of the graph. In particular, we 
see a dense cluster of participants who have implicit theories scores from 4.5 to about 6.2 blaming solidly 
at a score of 9.0. This demonstrates that Incremental Theorists are associated with placing higher blame on 
















In figure 17, the pattern isn’t as visually clear as in figure 10, but there is a cluster of data where participants 
who have implicit theories scores from 4.5 to 6.0 are blaming at around a 7.0.  
 
Contrastingly, as evidenced by the prior implicit theory literature, being an entity theorist of 
personality (psychological attribute as opposed to a mental state) is associated with ascribing higher blame. 
However, this was only significant for the Accidental category (p < .01) and not the Moral Decision or 









As opposed to the last two figures (16 and 17), here the data are aggregated at the bottom half of the 
scatterplot because, generally, subjects were placing less blame on Accidental Scenarios than on Moral 
Decision or Emotionally Reactive scenarios. We also see that participants with Implicit Theories of 
Personality scores from 2.0 to 3.5, entity theorists, are placing more blame at scores from 4.5 to 6.0. 
However, although the correlation trend is mathematically stronger than for the previous two scatterplots, 
visually it is a bit harder to detect.  
 
Interestingly, for both categories of Implicit Theories (emotions and personality), having an entity 
theory was related to having achieved a higher level of education. And lastly, it is curious that the significant 
relationship between Implicit Theories of Emotions and blame on the Moral Decision Scenarios is stronger 
in Study 1 than Study 2. A possible explanation is that the correlations were not as ‘pure’ in Study 2 as they 
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were in Study 1. Participants in Study 2 were exposed to the judgment scenarios after they had already been 
exposed to the entity and/or incremental manipulation. Therefore, the manipulation could have solidified 
their existing theories, contradicted them, or had no effect for certain participants. Ultimately, this probably 
attenuated the strength of all the correlations. To further explore this issue, I created two different 
correlation matrices that differ by condition. This let me analyze the affect that my manipulation had on the 
pivotal correlations between prior implicit beliefs and judgment.  
 
Part 3: Correlation Matrices by Condition   























Theory of  
Emotions 




.113 .076 -.009 -.185** .059 .081 -.161* -.002 
 
 
In Table 3, we see that for those in the incremental condition, the correlation matrix reflects the same 
significant correlations between implicit theories and blame attribution as the aggregated (both 
experimental groups) correlation matrix. However, here the correlations are stronger and are more akin to 
the magnitude of the correlations I found in Study 1. Again, we see that being an Incremental theorist of 
emotion is associated with placing higher blame on actors in the Emotionally Reactive and Moral Decision 
scenarios. Additionally, holding an Entity theory of personality is associated with placing higher blame on 
actors in the Accidental scenarios. But, in this matrix, we lose the correlations between implicit theories of 

































-.103 -.020 -.087 -.103 -.003 .009 -.049 -.042 
 
 
When we look at the correlation matrix for the Entity condition, Table 4, we see that the previously 
significant correlations between implicit theories (of both personality and emotions) and judgment are lost. 
The only significant relationship that remains is the correlation between implicit theories of emotions and 
age. Thus, it seems that the nature of the incremental condition of my manipulation perpetuated the 
relationship between implicit theories of emotion and judgment found in Study 1 and in the aggregated 
Study 2 matrix. My incremental condition also perpetuated the relationship between implicit theories of 
personality and judgment found in the literature. Looking at these two new matrices simultaneously implies 
that something about my Entity manipulation may have affected participants’ lay concepts of emotions (and 
maybe even personality). The entity condition could have completely contradicted people’s beliefs about 
emotion controllability and malleability to the point that their understanding of emotions has changed. This 
intriguing possibility will be further evaluated in forthcoming sections.  
 
In the figures below, we see the new scatterplots for the significant (and now stronger) relationships 
between Implicit Theories of Emotion and Personality and Blame Attribution for participants in the 
Incremental Condition.  
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Fig 19. Scatterplot of the relationship between Implicit Theories of Emotions and blame in Emotionally Reactive Scenarios 




Fig 20. Scatterplot of the relationship between Implicit Theories of Emotions and blame in Moral Decision Scenarios 





Fig 21. Scatterplot of the relationship between Implicit Theories of Personality and blame in Accidental Scenarios 




In addition to running the regressions analyses, I tested whether the differences between the Implicit 
Theories and Blame correlations across the Incremental and Entity experimental groups were actually 
significant. I conducted a Fisher’s r to z transformation to perform a z test on the correlations of interest.  
The Emotionally Reactive correlations were significantly different from one another (z= 1.67, p < .05), but 
the Moral Decision (z= .67, p > .05) and Accidental (z= .86, p > .05) correlations were not. Thus, the 
disruptive effects of the Entity manipulation on the existing relationship between implicit theories and 
blame might only really be present for judgment on the Emotionally Reactive scenarios.  
 
Part 4: MANCOVA Analysis of the Implicit Theories Manipulation  
The means for each judgment scenario category across experimental condition were recorded. For 
the Emotionally Reactive, Moral Decision, and Accidental Scenarios subjects in the Entity condition were 
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placing more blame on actors than subjects in the incremental condition (Emotionally Reactive: Entity 
M=7.10, SD=1.40; Incremental M=6.97, SD=1.42; Moral Decision: Entity M=8.23, SD=1.10; Incremental 
M=8.00, SD=1.29; Accidental: Entity M=3.72, SD=1.61; Incremental M=3.62, SD=1.80). For the Neutral 
Scenarios, participants in the Incremental Condition were placing more blame on actors (Entity M= 4.89, 
SD= 2.68; Incremental M= 5.08, SD= 2.72). The blame means across condition can be viewed in table 5 
and figure 22 below.  
 
Table 5. Blame means (M) and standard deviations (SD) for each scenario category by condition  
 Emotionally Reactive Moral Decision Neutral  Accidental 
































Figure 22. Bar graph of blame means for each scenario category by condition 
 
  
I performed a MANCOVA to test the difference in mean blame scores by condition with prior Implicit 
Theories of Personality, Age, and Education Level as covariates in the statistical model. Age was held 
constant at 36.87 years, Education level at 2.96 (Undergraduate degree), and Implicit Theories of 
Personality at a score of 4.14.  Implicit Theories of Emotion had a non-significant effect on the model as a 
continuous covariate, so I left it out of this analysis. For the remaining covariates, I had to test the 
assumption that they were acting similarly across experimental conditions. In Tables 6 and 7 below, we can 
see that the assumption has been met because the mean Age, Education Level, and score on the Implicit 
Theories of Personality Scale are all virtually the same for the Entity and Incremental manipulation 
conditions.  
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics for Implicit Theories of Emotions and Personality for the Incremental Condition 
 
 Number of Subjects Mean Score Standard Deviation 
 
Age 
213 37.0 10.0 
 
Education level 
213 2.9 .7 
 
Implicit Theories of 
Personality 
212 4.14 1.74 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics for Implicit Theories of Emotions and Personality for the Entity Condition 
 Number of Subjects Mean Score Standard Deviation 
 
Age 
212 36.0 9.4 
 
Education level 
212 3.0 .7 
 
Implicit Theories of 
Personality 
213 4.14 1.72 
 
The overall multivariate Wilks’ lambda model was significant, which indicated that there was a 
significant difference between means of the entity vs. incremental conditions across the judgment scenarios 
(F(4, 417)= 3.55; p< .01; Wilks’ Lambda= .967; partial eta^2= .033). Thus, the implicit theories of emotions 
manipulation affected judgment, reflecting a causal relationship between Implicit Theories of Emotion and 
Blame Attribution. An analysis of the between- subjects effects indicated that there was a significant 
difference between Entity and Incremental Conditions for all four scenario kinds (Emotionally Reactive 
(F(4, 425)= 15.54; p < .01; partial eta^2= .129); Moral Decision  (F(4, 425)= 15.47; p < .01; partial eta^2= 
.128); Neutral (F(4, 425)= 2.60; p < .05; partial eta^2= .024); Accidental (F(4, 425)= 5.78; p < .01; .052). 
The difference in blame means between conditions shown in figure 18 and figure 19, demonstrates that 
participants in the Entity condition were placing more blame on actors than participants in the Incremental 
condition for the Moral Decision, Accidental, and Emotionally Reactive vignettes, but not the Neutral 
vignettes. In these scenarios, Incremental theorists were actually attributing more blame to actors! Thus, 
for scenarios in which the actor is displaying a transgressive ‘negative’ behavior, the Entity theory 
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intervention caused harsher judgment from the participants. In contrast, when the actor behaviors were 
‘Neutral’ (or as neutral as possible), the Incremental intervention caused more aggressive judgment. Even 
though numerically the differences between the means across conditions were not very big, the statistical 
significance was very strong with p < .01 for all of the scenarios with ‘negative’ transgressive behaviors 
(Emotionally Reactive, Moral Decision, Accidental) and p < .05 for the Neutral scenarios.   
 
Part 5: Two Factor MANCOVA Analysis of Prior Implicit Theories by Condition  
 
The Study 2 result, that being taught a strong Entity theory of emotions leads to significantly more 
blame attributed to actors behaving transgressively, seems to contradict the correlation trends that were 
found in both Study 1 and 2. To further understand this perplexing finding, I conducted a two-factor 
MANCOVA to capture the potential interaction between Prior Implicit Theories and my manipulation. It 
is possible that depending on one’s Prior Theory of Emotion or Personality, the manipulation had different 
effects on judgment. For both of these separate two-factor analyses, I removed the ‘Neutral’ scenarios from 
my dependent variables because in both Study 1 and Study 2 there was no correlation between prior theories 
and judgment for the Neutral scenarios. Therefore, the new MANCOVA models contained three dependent 
variables instead of four. The details of these analyses are explored below.  
 
Judgment Effects of Prior Implicit Theories of Personality by Condition  
I conducted a two-factor MANCOVA analysis to capture the potential interaction between prior 
implicit theories of Personality and my manipulation. It is possible that depending on one’s prior theory of 
personality, the manipulation had different effects on judgment. I added Age and Education Level as 
covariates to the model because, according to the correlation matrices, they are related to Prior Implicit 
Theories of Personality. Additionally, both covariates were strong predictors in the one-way MANCOVA 
analysis conducted in the previous section.  
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I executed a median-split to transform the prior personality theories into a categorical variable. The 
frequencies per level ended up being pretty even (189 prior Entity vs. 236 prior Incremental participants), 
and Box’s test indicated equality of covariance matrices (M= 21.3; p > .05).  
 The Wilks’ Lambda Multivariate test was not significant, which indicates that there wasn’t a 
significant interaction between prior implicit theories of Personality and Experimental Condition (F(3, 
417)= 1.49; p= .22; Wilks’ Lambda= .99; partial eta^2= .01). However, there was a significant multivariate 
main effect for the manipulation (F(3, 417)= 4.09; p < .01; Wilks’ Lambda= .97; partial eta^2= .03). 
Additionally, the univariate tests indicate that this main effect was significant for the Emotionally Reactive 
(F(1, 419)= 3.81; p= .05; partial eta^2= .01) and Moral Decision (F(1, 419)= 11.11; p < .01; partial eta^2= 
.03) scenarios. Therefore, the plots of the estimated marginal means for the Emotionally Reactive and Moral 
Decision Scenarios can be found below in figures 23 and 24. The main effect for the Accidental Scenarios 



































Fig 23. Blame Means Plot of Prior Emotion Theories by Condition (Emotionally Reactive). The main effects are significant 




From the plot, we can see that both kinds of prior Personality theorists were placing more blame in the 
Entity Condition and less blame in the Incremental Condition. Additionally, prior Personality Entity 
theorists were attributing much more blame to actors in the Entity Condition than prior Incrementalists. 
However, the difference across conditions was only significant for prior Entity theorists (F(1, 189)= 5.20; 
p < .05; partial eta^2= .03). This means, that for the Emotionally Reactive Scenarios, when Entity theorists 
of Personality were taught the Incremental theory of Emotions, they tended to attribute less blame than 
when they were taught the Entity theory of Emotions. Also, this manipulation appears to have a significant 
impact on the Entity theorists of Personality and not the Incremental theorists. Lastly, the univariate 




Fig 24. Blame Means Plot of Prior Emotion Theories by Condition (Moral Decision). The main effects are significant (p= < 




For the Moral Decision scenarios, we can see that again both prior Personality theorists were placing more 
blame when they were taught the Entity Theory of Emotions than when they were taught the Incremental 
theory. The difference across conditions is significant for both Entity Personality theorists (F(1, 189)= 5.29; 
p< .05; partial eta^2= .03) and Incremental Personality theorists (F(1, 236)= 5.51; p< .05; partial eta^2= 
.02). Therefore, when participants are judging actors in Moral Decision scenarios, the implicit theories 
manipulation was effective for both kinds of prior Personality Theorists. It was successful in lessening the 
severity of blame attribution for all participants. This wasn’t the case for the Emotionally Reactive scenarios 
(seen in figure 23). Another curious observation about the Moral Decision plot above is that for both 
conditions, prior Incremental theorists were blaming a bit harsher than prior Entity theorists.  
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Judgment Effects of Prior Implicit Theories of Emotion by Condition  
 I ran a 2-factor MANCOVA to see if my manipulation had different judgment effects according to 
participants’ prior theories of Emotion. Age and Level of Education were once again the covariates for this 
model. After conducting the median-split to turn my Implicit Theories of Emotion variable into a 
categorical variable, I was left with 103 prior Entity Theorists vs. 322 prior Incremental theorists. Because 
I was left with a small cell size for the Entity level, I did not meet the equality of covariance matrices 
assumption for MANCOVA (as evidenced by Box’s test (M= 35.5; p= .01). Additionally, prior Emotion 
Theories did not add significance to the multivariate model. Therefore, even though there were still main 
effects for this model, I omitted the plots for this 2-factor analysis. It’s interesting that for both the one-way 
MANCOVA and the two-way MANCOVA, prior Implicit Theories of Emotion did not make it into the 
final model. They did not seem to add much (if at all) to the various analyses. This phenomenon could be 
explained by the fact that there weren’t enough prior Entity Theorists of Emotion collected to make a 
difference. I have a feeling that if more Strong Entity theorists were included in my sample, the prior 
Emotion Theory variable (as a cofactor and/or covariate) would have added to the statistical models. 
However, it is very hard to find very Strong Entity theorists of Emotion in a random sample of people.  
 
DISCUSSION  
 Study 2 was able to replicate the correlation finding from study 1, that Incremental theorists of 
Emotions are associated with placing higher Blame on actors in Moral Decision Scenarios. Study 2 also 
found that Incremental theorists of Emotion tend to place higher blame on actors in Emotionally Reactive 
scenarios as well. Study 1 did not find this relationship to be significant. However, I believe this discrepancy 
was caused by the more accurate Judgment categories of Study 2 (the pilot studies ensured that I was 
creating accurate semantic representations between Moral Decision, Emotionally Reactive, etc.). Also, due 
to the much larger sample size of Study 2, I had a more even proportion of Entity Theorists to Incremental 
Theorists of Emotion. Study 1 represented mostly Incremental theorists (due to random chance) and 
probably the makeup of the Mechanical Turk pool of participants at that time. It makes sense that Implicit 
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Theories of Emotion are related to Moral Decision Scenarios and Emotionally Reactive scenarios (and not 
the Neutral or Accidental scenarios), because the behaviors in these vignettes are more closely related to 
the actor’s own passionate emotions and emotional impulses. From the Incremental perspective, because 
emotions can be controlled and can be changed, observing an actor who is very clearly demonstrating a 
failure to regulate their emotions and behavior will incite a desire to blame harshly. From the Entity 
perspective, because emotions are difficult to control and change, observing an actor’s transgressions is not 
as worthy of judgment because the actor can’t really ‘help’ that they are acting in an emotional manner.  
With respect to Implicit Theories of Personality and Judgment, I had hypothesized that, in line with 
the implicit theories of psychological attributes literature, Entity theorists of Personality would be 
associated with placing more blame to actors on the judgment task (Miller et al. 2007; Chiu et al. 1997; 
Levy et al. 1998; McConnell, 2001; Plaks et al. 2001). This hypothesis was supported by Study 2. 
Specifically, Entity theorists were associated with harsher judgment of actors in the Accidental category. 
Therefore, I was able to demonstrate an interesting difference between Implicit Theories and Social 
Judgment across two ontological categories (psychological attributes (Personality) and mental states 
(Emotions). Additionally, it makes sense that wielding a prior Entity Personality theory is more closely 
related to harsh blame on Accidental scenarios than having an Incremental theory. Since actors in these 
scenes do not display intentionality or foresight (only physical causality), Entity Personality theorists may 
explain the actor’s behaviors (and their consequences) by looking to stable, underlying traits like 
‘clumsiness’, ‘forgetfulness’, ‘inattentiveness’, etc. (Alicke, 2000; Miller et al. 2007; Chiu et al. 1997; Levy 
et al. 1998; McConnell, 2001; Plaks et al. 2001; Ulemant et al. 2008). Let’s take, for example, the scenario 
of the woman drinking close to the edge of a balcony. Her friend surprises her from behind and she drops 
her drink, injuring pedestrians below. From the Entity perspective, the actor is at fault because ‘she’s 
probably always this clumsy’, ‘she’s ‘dumb’ because she was drinking close to the ledge in the first place’, 
‘she’s inattentive because she probably should have heard her friend approaching’. These dispositional 
traits may be perceived as having caused the behaviors in the scenarios, thus driving blame attribution 
(Kressel & Uleman, 2010, 2015). On the other hand, the Incremental theorists may have noticed that the 
 81 
actor did not intend to hurt the pedestrians. She also did not foresee dropping her drink. Thus, the actor in 
this scenario is not worthy of blame.  
 Generally, the correlations found in Study 2 were smaller than the correlations found in Study 1. 
This is likely due to the fact that in Study 2, participants completed the judgment task after they had 
undergone the Implicit Theories manipulation. In Study 1, there was no experimental manipulation, so the 
correlations were ‘pure’ in that sense. Consequently, the experimental manipulation probably attenuated 
the magnitude of the correlations. It is probable that in Study 2, prior implicit theories were strengthened, 
contradicted, or not changed due to the experimental manipulation before exposure to the judgment 
scenarios. Therefore, to account for this discrepancy I ran the correlation analyses separately for each 
manipulation condition. When I ran the correlations using subjects in the Entity condition only, I observed 
a loss of the significance in the relationships between both kinds of Implicit Theories and Blame Attribution 
across scenarios. The only relationship that remained significant was that of Implicit Theories of Emotion 
and Age. Being an older participant was associated with being an Incremental Theorist of Emotion. 
Contrastingly, when I ran the correlations using only the subjects in the Incremental condition, all of the 
relevant Implicit Theories associations reappeared. And this time, the correlations had the magnitude of 
those from Study 1 (for Implicit Theories of Emotions) and of past research (for Implicit Theories of 
Personality) (Cabello et al. 2014; Tamir et al. 2007). Consequently, it seems that my Incremental 
manipulation perpetuated the existing relationships between Implicit Theories and Judgment. My Entity 
manipulation, on the other hand, dissipated these relationships. Therefore, it’s possible that being taught a 
very strong Entity theory of Emotions (that emotions are not at all malleable and not at all controllable), 
may skew people’s existing mental models of what emotions (and even personality) are (is). This claim is 
bolstered by the fact that in Study 1 and Study 2 and previous Implicit Theories Studies, prior theories of 
Emotion tend to be, on average, more Incremental than Entity leaning. This makes logical sense given that 
the transience of emotionality is a generally salient aspect of the human experience (Tamir et al., 2007; 
Flavell & Green 1999; Flavell, Green, & Flavell 1998; D’Andrade, 1987; Wellman & Hickling, 1994). The 
strong Entity manipulation in my study, then, might have created a prevalent dissonance between what 
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people had believed emotions to be and what they were taught in the ‘contrived’ scientific article, even if 
they are more Entity leaning to begin with. Since the ephemerality of emotional states implies that emotions 
are always changing, learning from a scientific article that emotions can never change or be manipulated 
was probably jarring on some conceptual level.  
 Because of the correlation trends found in both Study 1 and Study 2, I had expected that an Implicit 
Theories of Emotion experimental manipulation would affect blame attribution. The MANCOVA analysis 
verified this causal relationship. Additionally, the correlation trends prompted me to hypothesize that 
subjects who were taught the Incremental theory would attribute more blame to actors than those who were 
taught the Entity theory. Surprisingly, the manipulation had the opposite effect! Participants in the Entity 
Condition were ascribing more blame to actors behaving transgressively than those in the Incremental 
Condition, specifically to actors in the Moral Decision, Emotionally Reactive, and Accidental vignettes 
(controlling for prior theories of Personality, Age, and Education Level). Intriguingly, this judgment pattern 
occurred for the ‘transgressive’ scenarios where the actor demonstrated intentionality (Emotionally 
Reactive and Moral Decision) and for the transgressive scenarios where intentionality did not exist 
(Accidental). The difference in blame means between the two experimental conditions were very 
statistically significant at p < .01 for all three kinds of transgressive behavior vignettes. Additionally, with 
respect to the Neutral scenarios, subjects in the Incremental Condition were blaming more harshly than 
those in the Entity Condition. Therefore, when there was no overtly transgressive behavior present, being 
taught a strong Incremental theory led to more intense blame attribution than when actors were not behaving 
transgressively. It is funny to think that being taught the Incremental theory may make people less 
judgmental of actors committing transgressive and immoral behaviors, but more judgmental of actors 
executing simple and benign behaviors like eating a granola bar during a commute, sitting on a park bench, 
letting an unimportant phone go to voicemail, and jogging at dusk.   
An important question still remains: Why were the participants in the Entity condition placing more 
blame on actors committing transgressive behaviors? This finding corroborates the decades of extant 
research in which Implicit Theories of Psychological Attributes (Personality and Morality) were 
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manipulated to affect Social Judgment (Miller et al. 2007; Chiu et al. 1997; Levy et al. 1998; McConnell, 
2001; Plaks et al. 2001). In these studies, being taught the Entity theory (of Personality or Morality) or 
having a prior Entity theory (of Personality or Morality) was associated with higher attribution of blame 
toward transgressors and greater negative affect in response to the vignettes from judgment tasks (Miller et 
al. 2007; Chiu et al. 1997; Levy et al. 1998; McConnell, 2001; Plaks et al. 2001).  Therefore, a possible 
explanation for my Study 2 finding is that when you teach people that Emotions cannot change and cannot 
be manipulated (a very Strong Entity theory), their new Implicit Belief of Emotions affects judgment in the 
way that holding an Entity theory of Personality would. In other words, the Implicit Belief of Emotions 
now functions more like those of the Psychological Attribute ontological category would. To further bolster 
this claim, it is incredibly difficult to find strong Entity theorists of Emotion in the general population. Most 
people believe that there’s a degree of mutability to emotions and emotional states even if they have 
observed that emotion regulation requires effort (Tamir et al., 2007; Flavell & Green 1999; Flavell, Green, 
& Flavell 1998; D’Andrade, 1987; Wellman & Hickling, 1994). This ties back to the notion of temporality. 
One obvious quality about emotions is that they have a different degree of temporality than attributes like 
morality and intelligence (Tamir et al., 2007; Flavell & Green 1999; Flavell, Green, & Flavell 1998; 
D’Andrade, 1987; Wellman & Hickling, 1994). Unlike our traits, emotions come and go constantly as they 
are carried by the river of our consciousness. Consequently, learning that emotions are fixed and cannot be 
manipulated, may cause the new Implicit Theory of Emotion to drive judgment in the way that Implicit 
theories of Psychological Attributes do. The concept of ‘emotions’ may have fundamentally changed from 
something that is phenomenologically transient, and therefore inherently pretty malleable, to something 
that is more ‘trait like’. And finally, another piece of evidence for this theory comes from the Entity 
Condition vs. Incremental Condition correlation matrices. While the Incremental matrix preserved the 
Implicit Theories and Judgment correlations found in Study 1 and from prior research, the Entity matrix 
reflected a loss of the relevant associations. Subsequently, it appears that learning a very strong Entity 
theory of Emotions fundamentally skews the naturally (or most prevalently) occurring relationship between 
prior Implicit Theories and Judgment.  
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If we think back to Alicke’s CCM, this finding continues to make sense. If you teach people that 
emotions cannot be controlled and cannot be manipulated, this attenuates the degree of ‘Personal Control’ 
(intentionality, foreseeability, and physical causality) that people have over their emotions and behaviors. 
In other words, people can no longer intend behaviors or foresee the consequences of their actions because 
they are not the master of their own emotional worlds. Given the close link between emotions and behavior, 
when emotions cannot be regulated, people no longer control their behavior as well (Frijda 1988, Weiner 
1985, Weiner 1995, Crick and Dodge, 1994). Thus, the CCM ‘control’ variables (intention and 
foreseeability and physical causality) play less of a role in judgment, and instead Spontaneous Trait 
Inferences (STI’s) and affective reactions bias judgment (Alicke 2000; Nichols & Knobe, 2008; 
Nadelhoffer 2004 & 2005; Uleman et al. 2008; Kressel & Uleman, 2010, 2015). Participants’ affective 
reactions to the actors’ behaviors (and the consequences of those behaviors) override the ‘cool’ and logical 
evaluations of variables such as context and mental state, leading to harsher judgment (Alicke 2000; Nichols 
& Knobe, 2008). Normally, because people see emotions as transient and having some degree of 
changeability, Implicit theories of Emotion will affect judgment via personal control variables (e.g. 
intentionality inferences). This is why the correlations from Study 1 and 2 depict a pattern in which 
Incremental theorists of Emotion are placing more blame on actors in Moral Decision scenarios and 
Emotionally Reactive scenarios than Entity theorists. Blame attributions are being driven by the belief that 
Emotions can be controlled and changed, so there is an assumption that scenario actors have the ability to 
regulate their emotions and behaviors as well. However, when people can’t control or change their emotions 
at all, it is likely that they can’t control and change their behaviors (Tamir et al. 2007). Under this premise, 
actors’ behaviors are indicative of stable ‘trait-like’ qualities and, reciprocally, these qualities are thought 
to cause the actors’ behavior (Kressel & Uleman, 2010 & 2015). With respect to the Accidental scenarios, 
the Entity participants could be inferring actor dispositions such as ‘clumsiness’, ‘carelessness’, 
‘unfocused’, ‘dumb’, and ‘incompetent’. In the case of the Moral Decision and Emotionally scenarios, 
subjects might be inferring dispositions like ‘dishonest person’, ‘lacking in trustworthiness’, ‘inherently 
malicious’, etc. Researchers have demonstrated that ‘trustworthiness’ is the most inferentially pertinent trait 
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variable to judgments of who is moral; and it is the attribute that people most attend to in forming 
impressions of others (Leach, Bilali, & Pagliaro, 2015). Since the CCM personal control variables no longer 
drive judgment for those in the Entity condition, the ‘lack of trustworthiness’ portrayed by actors in the 
Moral Decision scenarios may have exacerbated blame attribution via affect biases and dispositional 
inference biases. In fact, previous research in this realm has emphasized that Entity theorists (of personality 
and morality) feel more anger when judging morally transgressive behaviors (Miller et al. 2007; Levy et al. 
1998; McConnell, 2001; Plaks et al. 2001). This intense anger likely increases cognitive load, thus making 
it harder for participants to search for contextual or mental state clues to an actor’s intentionality, foresight, 
and physical control over the situation. As a result, dispositional inferences become more cognitively 
accessible during social judgment.  
I also conducted a 2-factor MANCOVA with prior Implicit Theories as a factor in the model. This 
allowed me to observe whether my manipulation had divergent effects on subjects depending on their lay 
theories of Emotions and Personality. When I included prior Implicit Theories of Personality into the 
MANCOVA, there was no significant interaction but the experimental Condition still had a main effect. 
However, the univariate tests indicated that the main effect was significant for Emotionally Reactive and 
Moral Decision scenarios. When looking at the plot (figure 22) of the Blame means across Condition for 
Emotionally Reactive scenarios, I observed that the manipulation had the same effect for both prior 
Theories. Namely, the manipulation increased blame attribution for prior Entity and Incremental 
Personality theorists that were placed in the Entity Condition and decreased blame attribution for all prior 
theorists in the Incremental Condition. But, this difference between Conditions was only significant for the 
participants wielding prior Entity Personality theories. For these individuals, the manipulation decreased 
their Blame from M= 7.3 to M= 6.9. Therefore, for scenarios where actors were executing transgressive 
‘emotionally reactive’ behavior, prior implicit Theories of Personality really made a difference in judgment 
when exposed to an Entity theory intervention. An important takeaway is that the manipulation did not 
affect the prior theories in the same way. Prior Entity theorists of personality (and potentially of emotions) 
may benefit more from this kind of intervention.  
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When I looked at the plot (figure 23) of the Blame means across Condition for Moral Decision 
Scenarios, I observed that (like the Emotionally Reactive scenarios) teaching participants the Entity theory 
caused all prior theorists to attribute more blame than when they were taught the Incremental theory. 
However, for Moral Decision scenarios both the prior Entity and Incremental Personality theorists change 
in judgment across conditions were significant. This implies that the manipulation didn’t just affect prior 
Entity theorists, it affected both prior theorists (and in the same way). Therefore, an Implicit Theories of 
Emotion Intervention or Manipulation targeted at reducing judgment of actors acting in ‘Immoral’ ways 
may be beneficial for participants with both Entity and Incremental prior theories of Personality.  
Taking both the Emotionally Reactive and Moral Decision Scenarios into account (for the 2-factor 
MANCOVA) we learn that, for Implicit Theories of Emotions manipulations, prior theories of Personality 
matter. Understanding what people are bringing to the lab/classroom before teaching them emotion theories 
matters. But prior theories don’t seem to matter in the same way for all kinds of social scenarios. They 
matter more for situations in which people are behaving transgressively in an Emotionally Reactive way 
rather than making some sort of transgressive Moral Decision and behavior. So, implicit theories 
interventions aimed at attenuating judgment of Emotionally Reactive behaviors, may only work for those 
with a prior Entity theories of Personality (and probably of Emotion as well). But, for both Moral Decision 
and Emotionally Reactive social scenarios, it appears that teaching a strong Entity theory of Emotions 
ultimately leads to harsher judgment than teaching an Incremental theory (regardless of prior theory of 
Personality).  
The 2- factor MANCOVA with prior Emotion theories as a factor, did not make it into this 
dissertation. Even though there were main effects, the equality of covariance matrices assumption was 
violated and the cofactor itself didn’t seem to add any statistical significance of the overall model. The same 
can be said for the 1-factor MANCOVA in which prior theories were considered for inclusion as covariates. 
However, I don’t believe that prior Implicit Theories of Emotion do not matter for an Implicit Theories of 
Emotion manipulation or intervention. Instead, I believe that they didn’t affect statistical significance in my 
study because there weren’t enough strong prior Entity theorists of Emotion to make a difference. A 
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replication of this study in a population that specifically contains a higher proportion of Entity theorists of 
Emotion, a clinically depressed population for example, may demonstrate significant effects (Tamir et al. 
2007).  For this population, we might observe really interesting prior Implicit Theories of Emotions 
interactions with the manipulation and main effects on judgment.  
Another theory to explain the opposite trend between the correlations in Study 1 and 2 and my 
manipulation is that, the Implicit Theories of Emotions scale may not actually be accurately measuring 
Implicit Theories of Emotions. In fact, it is probably more accurate to say that the scale is measuring self-
perceived implicit theories of emotion, which may not be reflecting subjects’ actual theories. My 
manipulation, on the other hand, was not targeting self-perceived beliefs, but was instead trying to implicitly 
imbue subjects with very specific pieces of emotion knowledge. Additionally, the above logic can also be 
applied to the Implicit Theories of Personality scale, which was also used in my study. The self-perceived 
nature of this measure may explain why I did not find a significant interaction between prior Implicit 
Theories of Personality and my intervention when I ran the two-factor MANCOVA. It is possible that my 
manipulation interacted with participant’s actual beliefs about personality, but not the beliefs measured by 
the scale used in this study. The self-perceived beliefs (of both personality and morality) might not reflect 
‘real’ beliefs due to response biases such as demand characteristics. A participant may feel like ‘society’ or 
‘the researcher’ wants them to say that emotions are controllable, when in reality they feel the opposite way 
about emotions. Additionally, it is difficult to know what participants perceived ‘emotions’ to be while 
answering items on the Implicit theories of Emotions scale. The term ‘emotions’ to one participant might 
have meant the ephemeral mental states that come and go incessantly. But to another participant, the term 
‘emotions’ might have meant something more akin to a prolonged mood state (like depression or anxiety), 
which is likely given that Tamir et al. found correlations between scores on the Implicit Theories of 
Emotions Scale and depression and anxiety symptoms (Tamir et al. 2007). Thus, because it’s unclear what 
the scales are measuring and how individuals are interpreting words like ‘emotions’ and ‘personality’, 
making theoretical extrapolations (without qualitative interview data) becomes a bit challenging. 
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To conclude, Study 2 was able to demonstrate that there is a causal relationship between Implicit 
Theories of Emotion and Social Judgment. Subjects in the Entity condition placed more blame on actors in 
Moral Decision, Emotionally Reactive, and Accidental ‘transgressive’ scenarios than subjects in the 
Incremental condition. Contrastingly, when there was no overtly transgressive behavior (Neutral vignettes), 
participants in the Incremental condition displayed more aggressive blame than those in the Entity 
Condition. The variables Age, Level of Education, and prior Personality theories added to the variance of 
the statistical model. Additionally, prior Theories of Personality mattered for Emotionally Reactive 
scenarios. While the manipulation didn’t have an effect for Judgment on prior Incremental theorists, it had 
a large effect on those with prior Entity theories. Overall, it appears that participants in the Entity condition 
were placing more blame on actors executing transgressive behaviors because their concept of emotions 
had changed from mental states that (even for prior Entity theorists) are pretty malleable and potentially 
controllable, to something that is more stable and ‘trait-like’. Because of this, affective reactions (anger) 
and spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) affect blame attribution more so than personal control variables like 
intentionality and foreseeability.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 Despite the strong statistical significance, the manipulation did not have a numerically large effect 
on judgment means across conditions. This is because the intervention was relatively short and only made 
use of one scientific article with reading comprehension questions. While past studies have shown powerful 
results with the use of one ‘contrived’ article as a manipulation, future classroom or clinical interventions 
(and future laboratory manipulations) should be more comprehensive in their conceptual priming 
methodology and it should last for longer periods of time (Miller et al. 2007; Dweck & Chiu et al. 1997; 
Levy et al. 1998; McConnell, 2001; Plaks et al. 2001). Teaching theories of Emotions could include 
multiple ‘contrived’ or real scientific articles, and the knowledge could also be delivered through various 
media such as videos, virtual reality simulations, and literary narratives (Chan & Black, 2006). For long-
term interventions, judgment effects should be measured longitudinally over months or even years.  
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 My theory about the Entity Condition changing people’s lay concepts of emotion to be more ‘trait-
like’ thus leading to dispositional inference strategies, could benefit from more empirical support than that 
of Study 2. Making use of qualitative, and not just quantitative data, could help researchers grasp the 
specific nuances of the emotion conceptual change. For example, asking participants interview questions 
like ‘How did this scientific article change your beliefs about emotions, if at all?’, ‘If the scientific article 
about emotions changed your prior beliefs, did it contradict or augment them?’. ‘What specifically about 
this article changed your concept of emotions?’, ‘Was there anything about this article that wasn’t 
convincing?’, ‘Do you now believe that emotions cannot/can be changed? Do you think this will affect your 
perception of yourself and/or others? If so, how?’, ‘Does this article’s claims match your personal 
experiences with emotions? Why or why not?’, etc. These questions would also serve as additional 
manipulation checks. My only manipulation checks were two of the Reading Comprehension questions, 
which is potentially problematic. Therefore, qualitative data would serve two important purposes: 1. It 
would help the researcher analyze the specific ways that emotion concepts are evolving 2. It would provide 
the researcher with additional evidence that the manipulation actually imbued subjects with the intended 
emotion knowledge. Additionally, interview questions about the Judgment Task could be useful as well. 
This kind of qualitative information could help prove that participants in the Entity Condition are relying 
on dispositional inferences while those in the Incremental condition are relying on personal control 
variables during judgment.  Questions for subjects can include, ‘Why did you place blame this amount of 
blame on the actor?’, ‘Why is this actor deserving (or not deserving) of blame?’, etc.  
 Another way to prove that the Entity Condition participants are relying on dispositional judgment 
inferences is by timing all of the participants on the Judgment Task. Because a dispositional inference 
strategy requires less cognitive effort than an inference strategy, we can assume that the Entity Condition 
participants would spend less time on the judgment task than subjects in the Incremental Condition (Kappes 
& Shikowski, 2013; Miller et al. 2007; Schroder et al. 2015; Gross & Thompson, 2007). Additionally, 
studies have shown that Entity theorists divert attention away from distressing social stimuli rather than 
engaging with them and using a more cognitive strategy during perception and judgment (Kappes & 
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Shikowski, 2013; Miller et al. 2007; Schroder et al. 2015; Gross & Thompson, 2007). Contrastingly, an 
Incremental theorist, who tends to take into account personal control variables (intentionality, 
foreseeability), would probably be using more cognitive effort and, consequently, take a longer time to 
make judgments. Thus, the cognitive effort, especially the sustained attention, required for either a 
dispositional inference vs. person control inference strategy could result in tangible differences in time to 
complete the judgment task. Researchers should consider using this method in their future implicit theories 
studies’ paradigms.  
 Another interesting future direction for this study is to measure subjects’ emotional responses to 
the judgment task. Prior research has established that Entity theorists of Psychological Attributes tend to 
feel more negative affect after social judgment tasks (Miller et al. 2007; Kappes et al. 2013). It would be 
interesting to see if this finding extends to the realm of Implicit Theories of Emotions. In my study, I could 
have asked participants about their emotional state prior to starting the study and after the judgment task 
(Miller et al. 2007; Kappes et al. 2013). Or, instead of asking them about their ‘general’ emotional state, 
we can ask them specifically how angry, sad, and/or afraid they are after the entire judgment task or after 
individual scenarios. Asking about specific emotions, but also allowing for elaboration, may result in a 
more targeted understanding of how emotional reactions may affect blame attributions and bias judgment.  
 Like I mentioned in the discussion of my Study 1, a limitation of Study 2 is that I only targeted 
‘blame attribution’ as a dependent variable. However, just because a person tends to ‘blame more harshly’ 
this doesn’t mean that they will desire to retributively punish actors as well. It’s possible that someone who 
attributes a high amount of blame may still rather educate or rehabilitate an actor rather than punish them 
retributively. Therefore, in future studies, dependent variables such as ‘desire to retributively punish’ and 
‘desire to rehabilitate’ and ‘desire to educate’ should be included along with judgment. The construct of 
social judgment is an informative one, but doesn’t always translate to how an individual might behave once 
they’ve observed another person’s transgressive or immoral behavior.  
 Lastly, a really obvious improvement to this study is that I could have added prior Implicit Theories 
of Morality as another relevant prior variable and covariate. These theories might interact with the 
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manipulation in a significant way, especially for the Moral Decision scenarios. Unfortunately, this obvious 
connection didn’t occur to me until after running my dissertation study.  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PEDAGOGY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE REVISITED 
‘More attention should be paid to naïve theories of emotion in the realm of social judgment. The reason being that, since we all 
consciously (and subconsciously) attempt to ‘understand and influence the emotions of others, the average person must use 
implicitly held rules or laws related to feeling states’ in social situations.’  




 Humans make use of implicit beliefs about emotion to (for better or for worse) understand, interact 
with, and manipulate others in social situations. Social Emotional Learning (SEL) educators and clinical 
therapists can play a pivotal role in helping people understand the ways in which their acquired emotions 
beliefs affect their emotional states, action tendencies and behaviors. This will help people become more 
mindful of their emotional world and regulatory capabilities. Let’s think of a real-world implicit theories 
example. I often hear my relatives say things like, ‘I am depressed, which means that I have a lack of 
dopamine in my brain. Therefore, I cannot control it when I’m sad. It’s my brain doing that. It’s my 
chemistry. Not me. There’s nothing I can personally do to make the sadness go away.’ First, depression is 
a psychopathology, and thus is not reflective of the general ephemerality of emotions (Gross & Thompson, 
2007). However, this kind of reductively biological belief, while having some scientific basis, can skew 
people into having more of an Entity Implicit Belief of Emotions than an Incremental one.  In fact, Tamir 
et al. (2007) found that being an Entity theorist of Emotion is associated with displaying symptoms of 
depression during the transition from high school to freshman year of college (Tamir et al. 2007; Cabello 
et al. 2014). My Study 2 showed that, regardless if someone is a prior Entity theorist of Emotion and 
Personality (and possibly/probably depressed), they can be taught the Incremental Theory of Emotions and 
consequently become less hostile in their judgments towards other people’s emotionally reactive, immoral, 
and accidental behaviors. By extension, these individuals might become less judgmental toward their own 
emotionally reactive behaviors, immoral, and accidental behaviors. However, to really explore this 
possibility in future research, judgment scenarios must be ‘self-focused’ and not just ‘other focused’ as they 
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were in my study. Blame attribution, after learning new scientific emotion beliefs, may not display the same 
patterns for both self and other judgment. Nevertheless, my results show promise that interventions aimed 
at beliefs about emotion can have tangible effects on judgment, and can potentially benefit clinical 
populations, such as those with depression.  
 In 2013, Dweck and Yaeger created an Implicit Theories of Personality intervention designed to 
reduce adolescent aggression in response to peer victimization and exclusion. They used multiple strategies 
and sessions to imbue students with the Incremental knowledge that personality can change and is malleable 
trait. However, what they likely didn’t realize was that they were also teaching the Incremental Implicit 
Theory of Emotions as well.  During session 3 (out of 6 sessions) during the intervention, facilitators told 
the students:  
“Scientists have discovered that people do things mainly because of the thoughts and feelings that they have—thoughts and feelings 
that live in the brain and that can be changed. When you have a thought or a feeling, the pathways in your brain that lead you to 
do one thing or another…by changing their brain’s pathways or their thoughts and feelings, people can actually improve how they 
behave after challenges and setbacks. So, it’s not that some people are ‘rejects’ or that other people are ‘bad’. Everyone’s brain 
is a ‘work in progress’.  
- Yeager, Dweck, & Trzesniewski (2013) 
As you can see, researchers were targeting Implicit Theories of Emotions before any studies had even 
attempted to establish a causal relationship between these beliefs and outcome variables like judgment and 
aggression. Yeager and Dweck were successful in reducing aggression in their study, but it seems likely 
that they didn’t realize, not only were they manipulating implicit theories of personality, but they were also 
influencing emotion theories. At that point we weren’t yet aware of how these beliefs affected judgment 
and behavior. We cannot continue to assume that all of the research that has been conducted on implicit 
theories of psychological attributes can transfer seamlessly to the domain of emotion theories.  In fact, my 
correlation matrices indicate that prior emotions theories affect judgment differently than prior personality 
theories do. While my study does ultimately point to the potential promise of teaching the Incremental 
Theory of Emotions for social, clinical, and educational interventions of attenuating aggressive judgments 
(like prior implicit theories research), I believe that scientists, educators, and clinicians should proceed with 
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caution. More research is needed before we can take the results of my study and run with them. As 
mentioned earlier in this dissertation, there are aspects of the emotion system that can be controlled 
(regulatory strategies like cognitive reappraisal and attentional deployment are examples). However, there 
are also processes of emotion generation that we have less conscious access to (like our initial emotion 
appraisals). Thus, it is scientifically inaccurate to teach individuals, whether in a Social Emotional Learning 
context or a clinical context, that the emotion system is completely under our control. Teaching a very 
strong Incremental or Entity theory would ultimately be misleading. And, there may be benefits to teaching 
that some aspects of our emotional functioning are not under our conscious control. In fact, Lyashevsky, 
Cesarano, and Black (2017) found that teaching 18-25 year olds about the concept of appraisal (by 
accentuating its fast, automatic, and subconscious nature) led to an augmented acceptance of scenario 
actors’ emotional responses and action tendencies even when actors desired to act transgressively (but 
ultimately did not). So, it may be fruitful to investigate how learning about emotion concepts such as 
appraisal and reappraisal might be related to changes in implicit emotion beliefs and subsequent changes in 
self- acceptance/judgment and other-acceptance/judgment. With more research, we may come to realize 
that relying on only the Incremental theory for interventions and manipulations might be overly reductive 
and in some clinical or educational settings, may be harmful in some surprising ways. My suggestion would 
be that, to optimize the efficacy and benefits of implicit theories manipulations, these interventions should 
be accompanied by attribution training (Graham, 1997; Hudley & Graham, 1993; Weiner B, 1985; Weiner 
B, 1995). This kind of training would teach people to think about an actor’s mental state relative to their 
behavior, any external variables outside of the actor’s control, the actor’s awareness of their behavior’s 
consequences, etc. Therefore, we would be turning individuals’ focus toward personal control variables 
such as intentionality and foreseeability in social situations, in the hopes that they would rely less on 
dispositional inferences and perhaps even dodge being completely biased by their affective reactions.  This 
kind of training has shown promise in reducing peer-directed aggression among male schoolchildren 
(Graham, 1997; Hudley & Graham, 1993).  
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 Ultimately, my research leads to more empirical questions than concrete answers…and this is 
exciting! Nevertheless, there are some important takeaways. First, Implicit Theories of Emotion are 
causally related to Social Judgment, in particular Blame Attribution. Teaching an Incremental theory of 
Emotions attenuates harsh judgments in scenarios where actors are displaying emotionally reactive, 
immoral, or accidental transgressive behaviors, while teaching an Entity theory has the opposite effect. 
Also, this manipulation has more of an effect on prior Entity theorists of Personality for emotionally reactive 
behaviors than it does for individuals with prior Incremental theories. Therefore, this points to the 
importance of understanding what people’s lay beliefs are before teaching them theories of emotion for 
some clinical, social, or educational benefit. Additionally, Implicit Theories of Emotions interventions 
could be potentially beneficial for individuals who display symptoms of depression (particularly 
adolescents), since there is a link between having an Entity theory and being depressed. However, educators 
and clinicians should consider teaching more comprehensive models of emotion functioning, which include 
concepts that reflect a more nuanced view of ‘emotion control’ (such as appraisal and reappraisal). Lastly, 
it appears that teaching a very strong Entity theory of emotions may have the effect of changing people’s 
concept of emotions to something that is less akin to a mental state and more akin to a stable trait, thus 
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APPENDIX A: Judgment Scenarios for Study 1 [different from Study 2] 
 
Negative [emotionally reactive] 
 
(Anger and Frustration) Early one evening, a neatly dressed man runs up to a city bus station in hopes of 
being on time for an interview. The bus pulls away just as the man arrives, without taking notice of the 
man’s attempts to flag it down. Left behind, the man curses at the bus driver, and throws his briefcase to 
the ground close to a few other pedestrians.  
 
(Anger and Frustration) An instructor is teaching a large class during the fall semester. One of her students 
sitting in the back row asks a great deal of questions, raising his hand every few minutes. One day, the 
student asks a long series of questions during a particularly complicated lecture. The instructor slams her 
textbook shut and yells at the student saying, ‘I need you to stop asking so many unnecessary questions and 
I need you to leave the classroom...now!’  
 
(Anger and Frustration) A mother and her small daughter are walking through their neighborhood on a 
chilly evening. The mother is in a hurry to return home, but her child keeps stopping to point at things in 
the store windows. The mother yanks the child by the hand, for several blocks, to get her moving. 
 
(Sadness and Anger) A man enters his apartment and notices that most of his girlfriend’s belongings are 
gone. He then hears a voicemail from her saying that she no longer loves him. The man begins to cry and 
eventually kicks the wall multiple times leaving several large holes.  
 
(Embarrassment and Anger) A young student sits in math class after lunch and starts to feel sick. Eventually, 
she vomits in front of her classmates. She notices her peers watching with involuntary shock and disgust. 
She begins to cry and yells at her classmates saying, ‘What are you staring at you cows? Are you so dumb 
you’ve never seen someone get sick before?’  
 
Negative [moral decision] 
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(Pride) At a summer dinner thrown by a wealthy friend, a poet gets praised by the host for a poem most of 
which was written by someone else. A number of guests add their own compliments. The poet basks in the 
glow of this praise and does not disclose the true authorship of the piece.  
 
(Fear) A woman sits down to take her career’s certification exam; she has failed once before. As she begins 
to answer questions, her anxiety increases steadily. She begins to peer at her neighbor’s answers and copy 
several of them. She does this continually until she finishes the exam.  
 
(Envy and Anger) A man notices that the woman whom he secretly loves is giving more flirtatious attention 
to his best friend, Tom, during a conversation. In desperation, the man starts joking about all the 




A jogger is making his way through a park at an easy pace. It is dusk. Families are gathering at the picnic 
areas with food and music. The jogger notices that the shoelaces on his left sneaker are untied, but does not 
stop to tie them.  
 
Sitting on a bench by a lake, a woman reads the paper. Small birds skip around nearby, looking for crumbs. 
The woman realizes that she is cold, but does not put on her jacket.  
 
On a brisk, sunny morning a man gets out of his car and heads toward an office building. He is in a hurry 
to get to the tenth floor. But though the elevator is working, he takes the stairs instead.  
 
A woman sits alone in an office. It is after 10pm. She is concentrating on her work. She gets a phone call, 




APPENDIX B: Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) taken from Gross & John (2003) [Study 
1] 
 
The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire is designed to assess individual differences in the habitual use of 
two emotion regulation strategies: cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression. 
       
Instructions and Items 
      
We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular, how you control (that is, 
regulate and manage) your emotions. The questions below involve two distinct aspects of your emotional 
life. One is your emotional experience, or what you feel like inside. The other is your emotional expression, 
or how you show your emotions in the way you talk, gesture, or behave. Although some of the following 
questions may seem similar to one another, they differ in important ways. For each item, please answer 
using the following scale: 
      
1-----------------2------------------3------------------4------------------5------------------6------------------7 
strongly             neutral                                                   strongly  
disagree             agree  
              
      
1. When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change what I’m 
thinking about.  
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2. I keep my emotions to myself. 
3. When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change what I’m thinking 
about.  
4. When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them. 
5. When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way that helps me stay 
calm. 
6. I control my emotions by not expressing them. 
7. When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situation. 
8. I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in. 
9. When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them. 
10. When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situation. 
      
            
Note: Do not change item order, as items 1 and 3 at the beginning of the questionnaire define the terms 
“positive emotion” and “negative emotion”. 
      
Scoring (no reversals): Reappraisal Items: 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10; Suppression Items: 2, 4, 6, 9.  
     
 
 
Appendix C: Pilot Data: Semantic Categorization Distributions for Judgment Scenarios [Study 2]  
 
Participants from Teachers College Columbia University were recruited to ensure the correct semantic 
categorizations for Study 2’s judgment scenarios (N= 43). Below are all of the scenarios from the pilot, 
some of which were ultimately omitted because the data didn’t indicate strong agreements with the intended 
semantic category. Additionally, the pilot data led to some diction changes in the scenarios to create stronger 
agreements with the intended semantic category. These omissions and changes are indicated below. After 
all the changes and omissions, 4 scenarios per category were left for Study 2.  
 
Negative (Emotionally Reactive) Scenarios 
These scenarios were meant to fall mostly (above 75%- at least 28 participants) under the ‘negative’ 
semantic categorization, but also display more of a spread, which includes a few ‘accidental’ or 
‘filler/neutral’ categorizations because emotionally reactive behaviors are generally perceived as being 
less ‘controllable’ and ‘intended’ reactions than Moral Decision negative behaviors.  
 
On a fall afternoon, a woman overhears some people at a restaurant expressing political views very different 
from her own. The woman feels a growing disgust, and finally blurts out, “You’re all complete idiots and 
should keep your mouths shut!”  
 






Early one evening, a neatly dressed man runs up to a city bus station in hopes of being on time for an 
interview. The bus pulls away just as the man arrives, without taking notice of the man’s attempts to flag it 
down. Left behind, the man curses at the bus driver and throws his briefcase to the ground close to a few 
other pedestrians.  
 




An instructor is teaching a large class during the fall semester. One of her students sitting in the back row 
asks many questions, raising his hand every few minutes. One day, the student asks a long series of 
questions during a particularly complicated lecture. The instructor slams her textbook shut and yells at the 
student saying, ‘I need you to stop asking so many unnecessary questions and I need you to leave the 
classroom...now!’  
 
Which of the following best describes the instructor's behavior? 
 
 
A young student sits in math class after lunch and starts to feel sick. Eventually, she vomits in front of her 
classmates. She notices her peers watching with involuntary shock and disgust. She begins to cry and yells 
at her classmates saying, ‘What are you staring at you cows? Are you so dumb you’ve never seen someone 
get sick before?’  
 





[OMITTED] A man enters his apartment and notices that most of his girlfriend’s belongings are gone. He 
then hears a voicemail from her saying that she no longer loves him. The man begins to cry and eventually 
kicks the wall multiple times leaving several large holes.  
  





Negative (Moral Decision) Scenarios 
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Moral Decision Scenarios will be semantically categorized as being more ‘negative’ than the 
Emotionally Reactive scenarios because there is more perceived intentionality and foreseeability of 
consequences. For scenarios to be used in study 2, they had to display at least an 85% ‘negative’ 
categorization [32 participants].  
 
An author is given a very tight deadline by his publishing manager. He hasn’t produced publishable work 
in months and is feeling desperate and hopeless. One night, the author finds a riveting short story written 
by an unknown amateur on an online blog. He decides to use most of the story, word for word, and call it 
his own. He submits the piece to his manager and never contacts the amateur to discuss shared credit.  
 




A woman sits down to take her career’s certification exam; she has failed once before. As she begins to 
answer questions, her anxiety increases steadily. She decides to peer at her neighbor’s answers and copies 
several of them. She does this continually until she finishes the exam.  
 





[OMITTED—to limit each category to 4 scenarios] A man notices that the woman whom he secretly loves 
is giving more flirtatious attention to his best friend, Tom, during a conversation. In desperation, the man 
starts joking about all the womanizing Tom has been known to do over the years.  
  





Jim is an actor, and he shares an apartment with his friend, Frank, who is also an actor. They are getting 
ready to go to bed. Both friends are auditioning for the same role early in the morning. This is Jim’s dream 
role, but Frank is considerably more recognized in the industry by casting agents. Nervous and frustrated, 
Jim decides to secretly change Frank’s alarm settings so that Frank is late to the audition.  
  




A young executive learns that a product they were responsible for has a defect and is going to be recalled, 
likely costing their company significant amounts of money. The executive is terrified of the consequences 
and decides to try to shift the blame on their deputy when explaining the situation to the company CEO. 
  





Neutral ‘filler’ scenarios 
These scenarios were meant to be semantically categorized as ‘neutral’. Neutral scenarios generally tend 
to be perceived less concretely and so to be kept in study two, they had to show at least a 70% [27 
participants] ‘neutral’ categorization.  
 
A jogger is making his way through a park at an easy pace. It is dusk, and families are gathering at the 
picnic areas with food. The jogger notices that the shoelaces on his left sneaker are untied. He stops jogging 
and crouches down to tie his shoes.  
  
Which of the following best describes the jogger's behavior? 
 
To decrease the ‘positive’ categorization of this neutral scenario, I made the following change:  
A jogger is making his way through a park at an easy pace. It is dusk, and families are gathering at the 
picnic areas with food. He looks at the time on his phone, notices that it's been 15 minutes since he left 
home, and continues jogging.  
 
 
Sitting on a bench by a lake, a woman reads the paper. The woman realizes that she is a bit cold, but does 
not put on her jacket.  
  





[OMITTED] It is morning, and a man gets out of his car and heads toward an office building. He is in a 
hurry to get to the tenth floor, but the elevator is taking too long to arrive.  After another minute of waiting, 
the man decides to take the stairs instead.  
  




A woman sits alone in an office. It is after 10pm and she is concentrating on her project. Eventually, her 
office phone begins to ring, but she does not pick up.  
  
Which of the following best describes the woman's behavior? 
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A man finishes his evening workout at the local gym. Upon leaving the locker room, he checks his bag for 
water and a snack. He finds a granola bar and begins to take several bites.  
  
Which of the following best describes the man's behavior? 
 
 
To decrease the ‘positive’ nature of this neutral scenario, I made the following change:  
A man finishes his evening commute from work. Upon leaving the train station, he checks his bag for water 
and a snack. He finds a granola bar and begins to take several bites.  
 
Accidental scenarios 
These scenarios were meant to be semantically categorized (at least 80%- 30 participants) as ‘accidental’.  
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A woman is enjoying the view from a balcony at a party. There is a glass of water sitting on the ledge of 
the balcony railing in front of her. After a few minutes, she leans over the railing to get a better view. 
Without warning, a friend suddenly grabs the woman from behind. Startled, the woman knocks over the 
glass of water, which shatters on the sidewalk below injuring a pedestrian.   
  
Which of the following best describes the woman's behavior? 
 
 
[OMITTED]A man carries a package intended for his best friend to the post office. The friend is desperately 
awaiting the arrival of this package. After the man leaves, the post office incorrectly sorts the package. The 
friend never receives it.   
  




A teenager is walking down the school hallway with several books in her hand. The tiles beneath her feet 
happen to be wet and she trips, falling on another student in front of her. They both hit the ground and 
acquire several scrapes and bruises.  
  
Which of the following best describes the teenager's behavior? 
 
 
A young woman is supposed to call a prospective employee for a phone interview. But when the time comes 
to make the call she discovers her phone has stopped working. The potential employee’s contact 
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information was in the phone. She is unable to get in touch with the person, who is left waiting with no 
word of what went wrong. 
  
Which of the following best describes the young woman's behavior? 
 
 
A man comes to stay with a friend. The friend owns a house with an unfenced backyard and a beloved dog. 
The young man goes out into the backyard, closing the door behind him. However, the door to the backyard 
has a bad latch. It slips open behind him, and the dog escapes. 
  














Cover Story  
 
You are invited to participate in two short surveys about human emotions and behavior. The two surveys 
are unrelated and will take a total of 15-20 minutes to complete. Each survey individually takes about 7-
10 minutes. In Survey 1, you will be asked to answer questions based on your beliefs about personality and 
emotions. Then, you will read a scientific article related to these topics and respond to questions about the 
article. In survey 2, you will be asked to respond to fictional scenarios for a moral philosophy research 




By clicking the 'Next' button you agree to participate in the 2 surveys based on the Informed 
Consent information provided below. You also affirm that you have not taken this study 
previously. If you realize that you have, please exit the survey.  
   
INFORMED CONSENT      
 
Introduction You are invited to participate in two short surveys about human emotions and 
behavior. The two surveys will take a total of 15-20 minutes to complete. Each survey 
individually takes about 7-10 minutes.     
 
 What Will I Be Asked to Do? Survey 1: You will be asked to answer questions based on your 
beliefs about personality and emotions. Then, you will read a scientific article related to these 
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topics and respond to questions about the article.      Survey 2: You will be asked to respond to 
fictional scenarios for a research database.      
 
What Possible Risks or Discomforts Should I Expect? Participating in these surveys 
involves very minimal risk, such as encountering hypothetical scenarios that involve characters 
exhibiting emotional reactions.      
 
What Possible Benefits Should I Expect? Participating in these surveys is not likely to 
provide any substantive benefits to you, aside from monetary compensation.     
 
Will I Be Paid For Participating? Yes. As per the terms provided via Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
you will be compensated for your participation.     
 
When Are the Studies Over? Can I Stop Early? The surveys are over when you have 
completed all the online activities. However, you can stop at any time even if you haven’t 
finished. Note, however, that due to the nature of the Amazon Turk platform, you can only be 
paid if you submit your work from both surveys in a complete state.      
 
Protection of Your Confidentiality Your participation is anonymous. No personally identifiable 
data will be shared with anyone outside the research team. All data will be password 
protected.      
 
How Will the Results Be Used? The results of these two surveys may be published in journals 
and presented at academic conferences. Your name or any identifying information about you 
will not be published.       
 
Who Can Answer My Questions About The Surveys? If you have any questions or concerns 
about either or both surveys, you can communicate with the Principal Investigator, Melissa 
Cesarano, at mmc2223@tc.columbia.edu. If you have questions or concerns about your rights 
as a research subject, you should contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) (the human 
research ethics committee) at 212-678-4105 or email IRB@tc.edu. Or you can write to the IRB 
at Teachers College, Columbia University, 525 W. 120th Street, New York, NY 10027.  The IRB 
is the committee that oversees human research protection for Teachers College, Columbia 
University.     
 
PARTICIPANT’S RIGHTS * I have read the above information regarding the surveys.  * I 
understand that my participation is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or withdraw 
participation at any time without penalty.     * Any information derived from the research surveys 
that personally identifies me will not be voluntarily released or disclosed without my separate 
consent, except as specifically required by law.      By clicking Next you agree to take part in 
the surveys.    







Survey 1   
Emotion and Personality beliefs;    
Scientific Article    
    
In this survey you will be asked a few questions about your beliefs on human emotions 
and personality. Then, you will read a published scientific article about emotions and 


























































































































































ITP 1 (E) The kind of person someone is is something basic about them and it can't be changed 










































































ITP 3 (E) Everyone is a certain kind of person and there is not much they can do to really 




































Scientific Article and Questions 
In this section, you will be presented with a scientific article, and then you will be asked some 








Q1 E In a sentence or two please answer, what does this article claim about our ability to control 
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Q2 E True or False: in the studies described by the article, researchers employed fMRI to 
conduct scans of participants’ brain activity to obtain their results. 
o True  (1)  
o False  (2)  
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Q3 E True or False: This article claims that we have very little control over our emotions 
(negative emotions in particular).  
o True  (1)  
o False  (2)  
 
	




Q4 E Fill in the blank: this article claims that we _________ change our emotions (negative 
emotions in particular).  
o Are able to  (1)  
o Are mostly unable to (2)  
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Q5 E In a few sentences, please write about a time in your life when it seemed like you had very 
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Q6 E In a few sentences, please write about a time in your life when you witnessed someone 












Scientific Article and Questions 
In this section, you will be presented with a scientific article, and then you will be asked some 







Q1 I In a sentence or two please answer, what does this article claim about our ability to control 
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Q2 I True or False: in the studies described by the article, researchers employed fMRI to 
conduct scans of participants’ brain activity to obtain their results. 
o True  (1)  
o False  (2)  
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Q3 I True or False: this article claims that we have a lot of control over our emotions (negative 
emotions in particular).  
o True  (1)  
o False  (2)  
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Q4 I Fill in the Blank: this article claims that ________ to change our emotions (negative 
emotions in particular). 
o We are able   (1)  
o We are mostly unable to  (2)  
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Q5 I In a few sentences, please write about a time in your life when it seemed like you had a 









Page Break  
Q6 I In a few sentences, please write about a time in your life when you witnessed someone 

















End of Survey 1   
Thank you for your responses. You have reached the end of Survey 1! Please click the arrow 















In this survey, you will respond to several fictional scenarios. We want to understand how 
participants react to these scenarios. Please go with your 'gut feeling' when responding. Your 
responses will be used to help researchers create a database of scenarios for future psychology 
and cognitive science research. After responding to the scenarios, you will answer a few 
questions about yourself.  
There are no right or wrong answers. And again, all data are anonymized and kept confidential.  
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Q1J ER  On a fall afternoon, a woman overhears some people at a restaurant expressing 
political views very different from her own. The woman feels a growing disgust, and finally blurts 
out, “You’re all complete idiots, and you morons should keep your mouths shut!”  




Q2J ER Early one evening, a neatly dressed man runs up to a city bus station in hopes of being 
on time for an interview. The bus pulls away just as the man arrives, without taking notice of the 
man’s attempts to flag it down. Left behind and upset, the man curses at the bus driver and 
throws his briefcase to the ground close to a few other pedestrians. 
How blameworthy is the man for his actions?  
 
 
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 






o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 











Q3J ER  An instructor is teaching a large class during the fall semester. One of her students 
sitting in the back row asks many questions, raising his hand every few minutes. One day, the 
student asks a long series of questions during a particularly complicated lecture. Irritated, the 
instructor slams her textbook shut and yells at the student saying, ‘I need you to stop asking so 
many unnecessary questions and I need you to leave the classroom...now!’  
How blameworthy is the instructor for his actions?    
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 











Q4J ER A young student sits in math class after lunch and starts to feel sick. Eventually, she 
vomits in front of her classmates. She notices her peers watching with involuntary shock and 
disgust. She begins to cry and screams at her classmates saying, ‘What are you staring at, you 
cows? Are you so dumb you’ve never seen someone get sick before? I hate all of you so 
much!’  
How blameworthy is the young student for her actions?  
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 











Q5J MD An author is given a very tight deadline by his publishing manager. He hasn’t produced 
publishable work in months and is feeling desperate and hopeless. One night, the author finds a 
riveting short story written by an unknown amateur on an online blog. He decides to use most of 
the story, word for word, and call it his own. He submits the piece to his manager and never 
 135 
contacts the amateur to discuss shared credit.  
How blameworthy is the author for his actions?  
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 











Q6J MD                    A woman sits down to take her career’s certification exam; she has failed 
once before. As she begins to answer questions, her anxiety increases steadily. She decides to 
peer at her neighbor’s answers and copies several of them. She continues this strategy until she 
finishes the exam.  
How blameworthy is the woman for her actions?  
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 











Q7J MD Jim is an actor, and he shares an apartment with his friend, Frank, who is also an 
actor. They are getting ready to go to bed. Both friends are auditioning for the same role early in 
the morning. This is Jim’s dream role, but Frank is considerably more recognized in the industry 
by casting agents. Nervous and frustrated, Jim decides to secretly change Frank’s alarm 
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settings so that Frank is late to the audition.  
How blameworthy is Jim for his actions?  
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 











Q8J MD A young executive learns that a product he was responsible for has a defect and is 
going to be recalled, likely costing their company significant amounts of money. The executive is 
terrified of the consequences and decides to try to shift the blame on their deputy when 
explaining the situation to the company CEO.  
How blameworthy is the young executive for his actions?  
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 











Q9J N A jogger is making his way through a park at an easy pace. It is dusk, and families are 
gathering at the picnic areas with food. He looks at the time on his phone, notices that it's been 
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15 minutes since he left home, and continues jogging.  
How blameworthy is the jogger for his actions?     
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 











Q10J N Sitting on a bench by a lake, a woman reads the paper. The woman realizes that she is 
a bit cold, but does not put on her jacket.  
How blameworthy is the woman for her actions?    
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 











Q11J N A woman sits alone in an office. It is after 10 pm and she is concentrating on her 
project. Eventually, her office phone begins to ring, but she does not pick up.  
How blameworthy is the woman for her actions?  
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 












Q12J N  A man finishes his evening commute from work. Upon leaving the train station, he 
checks his bag for water and a snack. He finds a granola bar and begins to take several 
bites.    How blameworthy is the man for his actions? 
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 











Q13J A A woman is enjoying the view from a balcony at a party. There is a glass of water sitting 
on the ledge of the balcony railing in front of her. After a few minutes, she leans over the railing 
to get a better view. Without warning, a friend suddenly grabs the woman from behind. Startled, 
the woman knocks over the glass of water, which shatters on the sidewalk below injuring a 
pedestrian.  
How blameworthy is the woman for her actions?   
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 











Q14J A A teenager is walking down the school hallway with several books in his hand. The tiles 
beneath his feet happen to be wet and he trips, falling on another student in front of him. They 
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both hit the ground and acquire several scrapes and bruises.  
How blameworthy is the teenager for his actions?  
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 











Q15J A A young woman is supposed to call an important prospective employee for a phone 
interview. However, right before the call her phone stops working. The potential employee’s 
contact information was on the phone. So, she is unable to get in touch with the person in time 
for the interview. They're left waiting with no word of what went wrong. 
How blameworthy is the young woman for her actions?  
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 










Q16J A   A man comes to stay with a friend. The friend owns a house with an unfenced 
backyard and a beloved dog. The young man goes out into the backyard, closing the door 
behind him. However, the door to the backyard has a bad latch. It slips open behind him, and 
the dog escapes. 
How blameworthy is the man for his actions?  
 1 (1) 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) 9 (9) 
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Suspicion Probe:  In a few sentences, please explain what you believe to be the purpose(s) of 










Q81 Have you previously participated in an MTurk study or studies that are very similar or 
identical to any of the studies you just completed? 
o I HAVE previously participated in a VERY similar study  (1)  
o I have previously participated in this exact study  (2)  






Q80 You have now finished Survey 2! Thank you for participating! When you have finished 
reading the following statement, please click the arrow below to record your responses and 
receive the compensation code.  
    
DEBRIEF: Now that you've finished the surveys, we can explain their true purpose! In fact, all of 
the preceding surveys were part of a single study and the scientific articles that you read were 
not real. We were interested in whether temporarily manipulating people's beliefs about emotion 
controllability and malleability might affect social cognition in the form of blame attribution. We 
theorized that an individual’s prior theories about emotion and personality might affect the 
efficacy of the manipulation and that the manipulation's effects would vary across scenarios with 
different levers of actor intentionality and foreseeability.  
    
If you want any more information on these two surveys or have any questions about 



















APPENDIX E: Q-Q Plots for Multivariate Normality Assumption (Study 2)  
 













Accidental Judgment Scenarios  
 
 
 
